Komrades to the Rescue: Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Ukraine in 2014 through the Lens of Izvestiia by Koleva, Katarina
 Komrades to the Rescue: Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Ukraine in 2014 through 





















Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 






















School of Graduate Studies 
 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
By:  Katarina Koleva                                                                                                              
Entitled: Komrades to the Rescue: Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Ukraine in 2014 through the Lens of 
Izvestiia                                                                                                     
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts in Journalism Studies 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to 
originality and quality. 
Signed by the final examining committee: 
Dr. Mike Gasher______________________________________ Chair 
Dr. Alison Rowley______________________________________ Examiner 
Dr. Andrea Hunter______________________________________ Examiner 
Dr. James McLean______________________________________ Supervisor 
Approved by ________________________________________________  
                               Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director 
________________________________________________  
           Dean of Faculty 












This thesis examines communist and post-communist press texts, as they are represented 
in the Russian newspaper Izvestiia. Taking a before-and-after approach, two case studies are 
performed, as well as compared and contrasted. The first examines articles documenting the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Using the same newspaper title, the second 
investigates news coverage of the crisis over Ukraine in 2014. The study employs a Cold War 
framework to examine and correlate questions about the role and place of journalism then and 
now, by exploring both similarities and differences, from an explicitly linguistic angle. Applying 
a framing approach as a type of Critical Discourse Analysis, not only as a method of research, 
but also as a broader theoretical framework, the thesis aims to articulate a deeper understanding 
of the operational realities of Russian journalism and its troubled transition from Soviet to post-
Soviet times, as well as to uncover its professional techniques in building imaginaries about 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
In the summer of 1989 Moscow State University hosted a very unusual conference for the 
times entitled: “Images of the USSR in the United States and the USA in the Soviet Union.” It 
brought together leading American and Russian journalists and journalism scholars to discuss the 
implications for the news media of the ending of the Cold War. The forum was seen as an 
“unparalleled opportunity for scholarly interchange and cooperation” (Dennis, Gerbner & 
Zassoursky, 1991, p. ix). Its stated goal was to foster mutual understanding and to overcome the 
bipolar East-West or communist-anti-communist portrayals of a world of enduring enmity. 
Many scholars recognized then that, “What people in the USSR know about the United 
States and vice versa is largely a result of the media and other products of popular culture” (p. 
vii). As a consequence, all scholars who attended agreed that media images would represent the 
best barometer of success or failure in dismantling the Cold War legacy and in achieving new 
political thinking beyond the spirit of hostility. However, along with the optimistic view that a 
new way of communications was possible, there were some sceptics who doubted that the “war 
of words” was over (Dennis et al., p. 9).  
Twenty-five years later, the sceptics appear to have been proven right. Although 
tremendous changes occurred in the West over the years, and the fall of Communism in Russia 
and former Soviet satellites brought a “wind of change” to the East as well, Cold War rhetoric 
has returned with a vengeance. By 2014, echoes of the old “dichotomized world of Communist 




defined news practices when the West and Russia came face-to-face (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, 
p. 30).  
The most pressing example is, of course, the conflict in Ukraine where the news media in 
both camps have become the prime suppliers of persistent threat images about a second or a new 
Cold War in portraying the strained nature of Russia-US relations. The intensifying fighting in 
Ukraine, which claimed up to five thousand lives in its first year, has resonated with a growing 
news media battle of conflicting narratives. If seen as a test for reporting beyond the old Cold 
War constraints, the vast majority of both Western and Russian news media have failed.  The 
news media not only brought back the Cold War reasoning in its simplest dichotomized 
understanding, but demonstrated that regardless of the global environment we live in, mastering 
conflict coverage in black and white strokes still constitutes a powerful news media technique in 
portraying other countries considered as enemies.  
As Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the journal Russia in Global Affairs, noted in a 
June 2014 roundtable in Moscow that brought together representatives of leading newspapers 
from 23 countries – including the Washington Post, Le Figaro, China Business News, and La 
Nacion – “we have come up against the problem of Russian and Western media giving a 
simplistic interpretation of the serious ethno-cultural and historical problems of Ukraine” 
(Litovkin, 2014).   
The journalistic leaders who attended the roundtable warned that the events surrounding 
Ukraine have dragged the world into a new information war, even worse than the real Cold War 
in terms of its emotional and subjective rhetoric. Indeed, from a journalistic standpoint, the 
events in Ukraine have blurred the difference between facts and editorial opinions resulting in 




media coverage of Ukraine earns a distinctive place as a mockery of what, in academic terms, are 
perceived to be fundamental principles of journalism: practices which are informative, objective, 
critical, seeking of explanations and a challenge to the dominant narrative.  
At a time when many of the most important scholarly questions about journalism revolve 
around issues of crisis or progress – a matter of opinion – due to the challenges brought by the 
new technological milieu, there would be much to be gained, as this thesis aims to demonstrate, 
from revisiting questions of what journalism was or should be in theory, and what it is in 
practice. A particular focus on the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian context provides a compelling 
opportunity to reveal just how far journalism has drifted from its theoretical ideals.  
A number of reasons support the argument for a closer scholarly engagement with 
Russian journalism. As a point of departure, it is worth mentioning its timeliness. Russia and the 
crisis in Ukraine have dominated international news coverage, at this writing, for almost two 
years. Furthermore, the actions of Vladimir Putin at the head of the Russian State have revived 
the Cold War narrative in Russia and about Russia as never before. A detailed examination of 
the way the narrative has played out in the Russian context would produce a more fruitful 
understanding of what journalists in Russia are facing in their everyday work, why many of them 
prefer to leave the country and work from abroad, and finally what is going on in Putin’s Russia 
as a whole.  
More specifically, the study supporting this thesis uses the Cold War framework to 
examine, compare and contrast communist and post-communist press texts, as reflected in the 
Russian newspaper Izvestiia. It investigates questions about the role and place of journalism then 
and now, by exploring both similarities and differences, from an explicitly linguistic angle, 




also as a broader theoretical framework. The basic premise is that language and journalistic texts 
serve as barometers of political and sociocultural changes.  Therefore, the language deployed in 
press texts correlates with the progress or retrogression of Russian journalism since Communist 
times.   
To draw both communist and post-communist journalism perspectives into a dialogue, 
the thesis contrasts and compares press texts from two case studies. First, the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 which took place in the midst of the real Cold War and second, the 
crisis over Ukraine in 2014 referred to as a second or a new Cold War.1  
The invasion of Czechoslovakia took place on August 20-21, 1968, when the Soviet 
Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact invaded the country in order to stop the liberalisation 
reforms, known as the Prague Spring. The reform movement began in January 1968, after the 
reformist Alexander Dubček was elected First Secretary of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia.  The Prague Spring reforms were an attempt by Dubček to give his country 
what had become known as “socialism with a human face;” in other words, to grant his country 
civil rights such as the abolition of censorship and freedom of expression – that were unthinkable 
under the Soviet notion of socialism (Williams, 1997).   
The invasion successfully stopped the reforms and strengthened the positions of the 
conservatives within the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia, who strictly followed the line 
imposed by the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and its doctrine. This Brezhnev Doctrine, also 
known as Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty, concerned the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It 
                                                          
 
1 See, for example Davidoff, V. (2014, July 20). Russians Will Suffer in Putin’s New Cold War. The Moscow Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russians-will-suffer-in-putins-new-cold-
war/503782.html; Shuster, S. (2014, July 24). Cold War II. The West is losing Putin’s dangerous game. TIME 




was announced in September 1968 and was published by the communist flagship newspaper 
Pravda.2 In brief, it was designed to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as the right to 
intervene in other communist nations whose actions threatened the common values of the Soviet 
bloc. Designed as a doctrine of “political love,” it demanded trust and sincerity (Williams, 1997, 
p. 36).  
The Russian military intervention in Ukraine followed mass civil unrest in February 
2014, which led to the ouster of the pro-Russian Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, who 
had refused to sign an agreement of rapprochement with the European Union.  In March, several 
regions in Eastern Ukraine were occupied by pro-Russian activists. While the protests in Ukraine 
escalated, on March 16, a questionable referendum on the status of Crimea took place. Following 
the referendum, Crimea declared independence from Ukraine and requested that it become part 
of Russia. Two days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty in Moscow making 
Crimea part of the Russian Federation. In a televised address to the nation, Putin said he had 
corrected an “historical injustice” and had protected Russia’s national interests.3  
Putin’s words provoked severe reactions among Western leaders who univocally 
condemned the Russian annexation of Crimea. As a result, NATO suspended its cooperation 
with Russia, and the G8 summit, scheduled to take place in June 2014 in Sochi, was canceled. In 
fact, the summit of the world’s leading industrialized nations was held in G7 format, making it 
the first in decades to occur without Russian participation. In July, the tension over Ukraine 
escalated after the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 near the Ukrainian-Russian border.  
                                                          
 
2 Суверенитет и интернациональные обязанности социалистических стран [Sovereignty and International 
Responsibilities of Socialist Countries]. (1968, September 26). Pravda. Retrieved from McGill University 
Microfilm Archive. Copy in possession of author.  





The United States, backed by several European countries, strengthened the economic sanctions it 
had imposed earlier on Russia. In retaliation, Moscow ordered a full embargo on food imports 
from the EU, US and a number of other Western countries. The conflict in Ukraine – and over 
Ukraine – is considered the most serious conflict between Russia and what the news media 
usually refer to as the West (the US and its NATO allies) since the end of the Cold War.  
The analysis of the aforementioned case studies aims to articulate a deeper understanding 
of the operational realities of Russian journalism and its troubled transition from Soviet to post-
Soviet times; to debate Russian journalistic values and professional techniques, similarities and 
differences then and now; to discuss the applicability of the Western liberal criteria of what 
journalism should be to that reality; and to draw specific attention to how the new Cold War 
narrative, as mobilized by pro-Kremlin journalists, draws on today’s Russian culture – through 
specific rhetorical devices, metaphors and other techniques – to build contemporary nation-state 
narratives.  
In addition, this thesis seeks to measure the degree to which post-Soviet Russian 
journalism has changed since Soviet times and, by doing so, to revisit some of the perpetual 
themes in journalism studies. Among them, the role of journalists in constructing images in the 
public’s perception of other societies; the interplay between journalism and propaganda; and the 
connection between language, power, journalistic texts and the broader sociocultural context.  
More precisely, the analysis explores the idiosyncrasies of Soviet Cold War and Russian 
post-Cold War discourses as reflected in Izvestiia in portraying two key events of the old and 
new Cold War. The basic premise is that language and journalistic texts serve as barometers of 
political and sociocultural change. Therefore, the analysis of pro-Kremlin press texts aids in a 




day-to-day professional traits, values, and importance with regard to the broader political and 
sociocultural processes that take place in post-Soviet Russia.  
In fact, this thesis makes the case that the pro-Kremlin press coverage of Ukraine, as 
reflected in Izvestiia, sets back Russian journalism to its Soviet roots wherein the purpose of 
journalism was the “transmission and periodical dissemination of information through mass 
communication channels aimed at propaganda and agitation” (Vartanova, 2012, p. 136).  It 
argues that Cold War and post-Cold War discursive practices of the Soviet and post-Soviet pro-
Kremlin news media provide empirical evidence – through language and journalistic texts – 
about the continuity of the old Soviet traditions as mobilized through discourses, rhetorical 
practices, and political agendas in Russia today. Thus, the Cold and post-Cold War news media 
discourses provide a related opportunity to uncover not only what the features of these discourses 
are, but also to shed some light on the role and place of journalists in Russia today, almost three 
decades after the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’ or openness, the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, and the ensuing collapse of the Communist regime.  
The following four research questions are of particular interest in this line of inquiry:  
 
 What types of discursive frames can be identified in Izvestiia, past and present, by 
comparing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Russian intervention in 
Ukraine?  
 Once identified, can discursive similarities be traced between 1968 and 2004?  





 Finally, what can these frames, similarities, and narratives tell us about the 
transformation of Russian journalism since 1989 – the year when the old Soviet 
regime, ostensibly, came to an end? 
 
Both case studies are used to substantiate the hypothesis that despite the collapse of the 
Soviet Communist regime in 1989 and the consequent political, social and economic changes 
that occurred in Russia and Soviet satellites in Eastern and Central Europe, the Soviet past still 
guides the rhetorical and discursive intentions of the contemporary Russian regime. Of greater 
importance, the pro-Kremlin press today still serves as an important ideological and propaganda 
tool validating political decisions and feeding post-Cold War discourses in order to build 
contemporary Russian nation-state narratives and imaginaries. The rhetoric and discursive 
constructions have been aided and abetted by new technologies of dissemination. That is, the use 
of the Internet has made it easier for state-generated discursive constructions to circulate, and 
such circulation gives the state the appearance of being more “modern” than it really is. As this 
study aims to demonstrate, however, content remains patterned after the old Soviet 
communication strategies. 
Indeed, the pro-Kremlin news media discourse provides a “regime of truth” – in the 
Foucauldian sense of the word – which, when disseminated repeatedly over time, becomes 
hegemonic in reinterpreting history, symbols, and even language to suit specific political 
interests and to justify political decisions. The Cold War framework, hence, is applied here as a 
useful tool to demonstrate the way in which this regime of truth operates in the Russian context, 




Izvestiia was selected as a primary source for analysis, first and foremost, because of its 
pro-Kremlin line and because of its existence during both Soviet and post-Soviet times. Because 
of this continuity, Izvestiia represents a useful means of contrasting and comparing the transition 
from the Soviet to the post-Soviet way of doing journalism and framing the Kremlin’s regime of 
truth. It also represents a unique “before-and-after” snapshot of discursive methods. 
 Usually translated as News or Reports, Izvestiia was established as the organ of the 
Supreme Soviet in 1917, and along with Pravda – the organ of the Central Party Committee – 
was regarded as the voice of the Communist Party and Soviet Government in the USSR. Over 
the years following the fall of the Communist regime, Pravda was relegated to a minor role. 
Izvestiia, however, which dropped its official function, is still regarded as a leading national 
broadsheet. It is considered a newspaper of repute, attracting a more educated readership 
(Voltmer, 2000, p. 474). Currently, the newspaper is owned by the National Media Group 
controlled by the St. Petersburg-based Bank Rossiia, whose co-owner, Yurii Kovalchuk, gained 
control in recent years over most big Russian media companies. Kovalchuk is considered to be a 
close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin. In this regard, it is not too big a stretch to 
claim that – in a system where loyalty is rewarded and enmity crushed – Izvestiia packages the 
news in accordance with the Kremlin’s political agenda. Therefore, by studying the newspaper’s 
discursive practices, features of the Kremlin’s dominating views in two historically different 
periods are also likely to be revealed.  
With this in mind, a series of questions occur: Why is this important? Why should the 
Western world care about how the Kremlin manipulates language for political ends? What is 
journalistic about this kind of production? How does it differ from propaganda? These are all 




It is worth mentioning again that Russia has been in the news literally every day over the 
last two years. Putin’s Russia and the conflict over Ukraine have attracted international attention 
and brought back questions not only about the Soviet-style of Putin’s autocratic ambitions, but 
also about the old propagandist ways of doing journalism and politics. To explain why we should 
care about Russia, Sun Tzu’s (1910) famous quote from The Art of War offers insight:  
 
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred 
battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will 
also suffer a defeat. (…) If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will 
succumb in every battle (p. 45).  
 
Drawing on Sun Tzu’s strategy, if the war of words over Ukraine is seen metaphorically, as a 
battle between two narratives – Western and Russian – then it should be very useful, from the 
Western perspective, to know more about what’s going on in the Russian camp, to be able to 
read or think about something that usually remains hidden from the Western eye. 
Furthermore, to understand the internal Russian narrative is to gain a window onto a 
world that is normally superseded by Russian media designed for external consumption, that is to 
say produced in English for international audiences in publications such as Russia Today, 
Sputnik, and Russia Beyond the Headlines. The content of these publications differs 
significantly, in terms of discourse, from the content crafted for internal consumption – for 
Russian people, in Russian.  If the former’s primary goal is to present Russia in a positive light to 
the world, internally circulated media reports have different purposes. Namely, they are the real 




Beyond that, they are the primary tool for Russian President Vladimir Putin to maintain 
hegemonic control over the Russian imagination and to keep his status as a strong leader and 
protector of what is considered to be the core of Russianness. Hence, the pro-Kremlin news 
media, produced in Russian for Russians, deserve serious attention.  
In addition, news reports crafted for internal consumption are much more vibrant, in 
terms of discourse and rhetorical devices, than their external counterparts. As a matter of 
professional and academic journalistic curiosity, it is tempting to know more about the way they 
represent the events in Ukraine, and are likely to represent events in other contested areas of 
conflict. Besides that, the analysis of a newspaper like Izvestiia, which is one of the oldest 
Russian newspapers, can be seen as a way to understand at first hand the frames and discursive 
aperçus of both Soviet and post-Soviet Russian journalism; to contrast and compare their 
similarities or differences.  
Ultimately, an analysis of communist and post-communist Russian press texts furthers a 
critical perspective regarding journalism and its vocation as a central component of an effective 
public sphere and civil society in democratic states (Russia is considered a democratic state, 
according to its 1993 Constitution), by demonstrating the importance of social and historical 
contextualization.4 By turning the focus on Russia, such an analysis aims to discuss not only the 
status of journalism in Russia today, as revealed throughout Izvestiia’s texts, but to reflect on the 
way that Western standards referred to as liberal approaches in the practice of contemporary 
journalism, contradict or overlap with certain Russian principles of what the profession stands 
for.   
                                                          
 





In general, it can be argued that in writing about Russian journalism, the conventions of a 
Western understanding impose upon the subject an aspect that does not belong to it. In spite of 
the criticisms that have accrued to the seminal Four Theories of the Press (Siebert, Peterson, & 
Schramm, 1956) this classic of journalism studies remains the major point of reference for a 
significant number of authors trying to tackle post-Soviet Russian journalism. As a result, most 
attempts by Western critics to explain the Russian example, even with contemporary 
modifications, retain the old ideological dichotomy between East and West, creating further 
ideological conflicts and mutual misunderstanding.  
As noted by Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, & White (2009) in their 
analysis of normative theories of the press and journalism in democratic societies, both 
journalism and democracy today are challenged. The old patterns of “the overarching framework 
of the Cold War” are confronted by the new challenges provided by the new reality: new 
technologies, the Internet, and the collapse of the Communist regime in Russia (p. 15).  
Again, the enduring question occurs: Did the new reality tangibly change the way 
journalism is done, in terms of its rhetorical and discursive manifestation, when it comes to the 
new Cold War? As this thesis aims to demonstrate, the answer is no. But it also aims to 
demonstrate that different models of doing journalism are shaped by different political, economic 
and cultural factors. To make sense of what Russian journalism is requires critical scrutiny and 
contextualization. By offering an understanding of Izvestiia’s reporting in both Communist and 
post-Communist times, this thesis aims to instigate critical reasoning among readers. What are 
the implications of Soviet and post-Soviet journalistic practices for democratic communication? 
Are they applicable to the “professional” criteria as understood by Western practitioners and vice 




study intents to show how different modes of journalism, typically labelled as “Soviet” and 
“post-Soviet” are articulated, how they complement or contradict each other.  
On a personal note, my own origins and experience have led me to this study. As an 
Eastern European born in Bratislava; raised in Bulgaria and Russia; as one who witnessed the 
fall of Communism in 1989 and the enthusiasm for democracy it brought; and as one who is 
currently completing a research-oriented master’s program in journalism studies in Montreal, this 
study carries particular meaning. My life experience, divided between East and West, combined 
with professional experience as a journalist, and the perspective of distance obtained in Canada, 
provoked a keen interest in seeking to understand what exactly has changed (or not) in the way 
the pro-Kremlin news media in Russia portrays the world, twenty-five years after the fall of 
Communism. In this sense, the conflict in Ukraine and the reminders of the old communist past it 
has rekindled, has provided both a framework and a starting point for this research. Moreover, 
the ability to speak and understand Russian affords an opportunity to not only read original 
journalistic texts, prescribed for internal Russian consumption, but to go beyond the texts to 
grasp the symbolic discursive meaning of the messages which usually remains hidden to the 
Western eye. 
In practical terms, the goal of this analysis is to enrich the perceived de-Westernizing 
paradigm in journalistic and media research. As Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009) assert, by 
internationalizing the world of journalism studies, and by bringing different voices and new 
perspectives to the conversation, journalism studies could be expected to contribute to debates 
beyond the disciplines of journalism, media and communication studies.  
For this reason, this thesis takes the position that Soviet and post-Soviet news media still 




some of the key issues in de-Westernizing paradigm is primarily chosen for personal reasons – 
motivated by the author’s personal background and research interests – such a focus can also be 
justified in terms of correcting its relative minor position within the broader debates on how 
journalism is defined beyond the dominant Anglo-American perceptions. A comparative study of 
communist and post-communist Russian journalism, as manifested in press texts, illustrates the 
contested nature of professional ideologies and values such as objectivity and truth-telling 
considered to be guiding lights for both Western and post-Soviet Russian journalism. In this 
regard, what Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009) call “the othering” of non-Western 
journalism, can rethink some of the established categories of the Western journalism itself.   
Last but not least, this thesis comes exactly twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. In this symbolic light, it is worth to scrutinizing the changes – and lack therein – of  Russia 
and other post-Soviet countries through the lens of language and journalistic texts, and to explore 
the viability of news media images, attitudes, and values associated with the old division of the 
world in contemporary reality. Drawing on the Russian context, can we talk about a successful 
transition of the news media from the communist model to what we see today? This is a valuable 
question that requires an answer because its amplifications go beyond journalism. It affects 
policies, perceptions, and ultimately people.  
Аs Tatyana Lisova, editor-in-chief of the Russian newspaper Vedomosti commented in a 
recent television interview: “The most dangerous thing that has happened this year [2014] in the 
Russian media is not the neutralization of the independent media but these seeds of hostility that 




year appealing to people’s emotions, spreading fear and anger, particularly in critical moments 
connected with Crimea and Ukraine.”5  
As Dennis et al. (1991) observed almost twenty-five years ago, in Beyond the Cold War: 
Soviet and American Media Images, media images would be – in the years to come – the best 
barometers of success or failure in dismantling the Cold War legacy and in achieving new 
political thinking beyond the spirit of hostility. Twenty-five years after the official dismantling of 
the ideologically bipolarized world, it is worth exploring what the news barometers indicate for 
past and present. 
To do so, the discussion in the following chapters is organized as follows. Chapter Two 
introduces the literature surrounding the topics of the thesis. To explore the specifics of the Cold 
War reality, as created by Izvestiia in the Soviet context, and then to apply the findings to 
contemporary Russia, the study mobilizes a wide range of scholarship concerning two distinctive 
themes. The first focuses on Cold War discourse, the Soviet notion of journalism, and its 
propaganda techniques. It aims to trace the historical context and the background for further 
discussion. It also endeavours to expose communist values hidden in Cold War narratives. A 
second theme then looks at the scholarship surrounding post-Soviet news media discourses and 
the Soviet legacy as it pertains to and influences journalism in today’s Russia.   
The third chapter introduces and justifies the method of analysis – a framing approach as 
a type of Critical Discourse Analysis – applied here as a methodology, but also as a broader 
theoretical frame. It explains in detail the way the study is done level-by-level, by addressing and 
deploying theoretical frames. It answers both the how and the why of the study.  
                                                          
 






Chapter Four is devoted to explanations and discussion of the study’s findings, an 
expression of the compare-and-contrast approach that emerges from the before-and-after analysis 
of Izvestiia. By implicating direct quotations from the newspaper, translated from Russian, it 
provides the evidence in support of the thesis. It traces out the frames and broader discourses, as 
mobilized within the Cold War framework, from both 1968 and 2014, in order to build closing 
arguments in the concluding chapter.  
The closing chapter draws final conclusions based on the research questions and the 
findings, to support the validity of the thesis and point the way to further exploration in the 
largely unmapped continent of contemporary Russian news media. It considers the applicability 
of the Western perspective in journalism studies to the Russian one, as evidenced by the 
findings, in order to produce stronger arguments and to place the findings within a broader 
sociocultural context. It incorporates the positive findings of the study, but also reveals potential 










Doing Journalism Then and Now 
 
Most scholarship about Cold War discourses explores the Western perspective toward 
Russia. Comparatively little scholarship has been done in English with regard to the 
idiosyncrasies of Russian discourse itself, especially after Stalin, i.e. the mid-1950s, and 
especially within the Cold War framework. Furthermore, from the Western perspective, original 
research in Russian is particularly scarce because of the language barrier. This thesis, therefore, 
intends to fill a particularly important gap in the scholarship by discussing discursive formations, 
from the Russian perspective, in order to understand how news media discourses are developed 
from within the Russian sphere of influence.  
In addition, there have been a great number of works on Russian media-power dynamics 
and its effects on journalism and democratization processes. A limited number of studies, 
however, concentrate their efforts on the qualitative analysis of press texts, actual reporting, 
media discourse, and the language of Soviet and post-Soviet news media as signifiers for 
political and sociocultural change. As Svitlana Malykhina (2014), Professor in Russian at the 
University of Massachusetts observes:  
 
Until recently, most studies of post-socialist media have taken a non-comparative 
perspective to focus primarily on the media’s ideological message and the freedom 
of the media from government control. Studies have also considered the impact of 




of economic reforms and new legislation in media transformation. Few studies have 
examined the actual reporting carried out by the media (p. 13).  
 
Similarly, in his analysis of the language of the press in Soviet and post-Soviet 
Russia, Von Seth (2011) demonstrates that comparatively little research has been 
dedicated to textual analysis of the role of Russian and the Soviet newspapers in the 
democratization process. “While there have been numerous important works on the 
Russian media politics front and journalism,” writes Von Seth, “… and studies on 
broadcast media performance, especially during national elections … the qualitative focus 
on press texts exploring how democratic values can be linked to media discourse is 
virtually absent” (p. 55).  A crucial aim of this thesis, therefore, is to contribute to a deeper 
appreciation of the link between democratic values and circulated discourses in the 
Russian context. 
To explore the specifics of the Cold War reality, as created by Izvestiia in the Soviet 
context, and then to apply the findings to contemporary Russia, this thesis mobilizes a wide-
ranging discussion of scholarship concerning two distinctive themes.  
The first theme contextualizes Cold War discourse: the Soviet notion of journalism and 
its propaganda techniques. It aims to trace the historical context and the background in order to 
lay the groundwork for a more contemporary exploration. It also endeavors to expose communist 
values hidden in Cold War narratives. The second theme looks at the post-Soviet news media 
discourse and the Soviet legacy as it pertains to and influences journalism in Russia today.  
In his introduction to the book Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology, 




with speeches, pamphlets, public information (or disinformation), campaigns, slogans, gestures, 
symbolic actions, and the like” (p. xiv). In other words, Medhurst addresses such rhetoric as “the 
issue” of the Cold War rather than a peripheral outcome of the underlying tension between East 
and West. In Medhurst’s view, such rhetoricity constituted the central substance of the 
ideological conflict and for this reason was (and remains) in need of serious attention:   
 
Cold War, like its ‘hot’ counterpart, is a contest. It is a contest between competing 
systems as represented, for example, by the Soviet Union and the United States. It is 
a contest involving such tangibles as geography, markets, spheres of influence, and 
military alliances, as well as such intangibles as public opinion, attitudes, images, 
expectations, and beliefs about whatever system is currently in ascendancy. The 
contest, in other words, is both material and psychological in nature (p. 19).  
 
As Walter Lippmann observed as early as 1922 in Public Opinion, “public opinion” itself 
could be seen as a constructed, manufactured phenomenon, to be shaped and manipulated by 
those with an interest in doing so. Lippmann identified the rise of a new professional class of 
“press agents,” functioning in the place of journalists, standing between political organisations 
and media institutions, manipulating public opinion, and creating what the author referred to as a 
“pseudo-environment” (p. xvii). 
 During the Cold War, these agents were assigned the task of navigating and 
manipulating, in Medhurst’s (1990) words, “the tokens used in the contest” – namely, rhetorical 
discourse. Cold War discourse was “discourse intentionally designed to achieve a particular goal 




images, symbolic actions, and, on occasion, physical actions undertaken by covert means” (p. 
19).  
Dennis et al. (1991) agreed, writing that the Cold War was first and foremost a “war of 
words,” where mostly negative images of the Other prevailed on both sides. As a consequence, 
both the US and the Soviet Union strictly controlled journalists and followed a policy that “did 
little to foster a free flow of information” (p. 5). The use of key, specific, and particular words 
mobilized against the idea of the Other was seen as the nucleus of Cold War mass 
communication techniques, along with visual and other ideological instruments (such as movies, 
posters, symbols) generated by both countries in the conflict for the purposes of propaganda.  
Propaganda, as the prominent American political sociologist Harold Lasswell (1927) 
defines it with respect to techniques used by the Americans, British, French and Germans in 
World War I, and as it is understood for the purposes of this thesis, represents “the control of 
opinion by significant symbols, or, so to speak, more concretely and less accurately, by stories, 
rumors, reports, pictures, and other forms of social communication. Propaganda is concerned 
with the management of opinions and attitudes” (p. 9). Placed within the context of the Cold 
War, propaganda exerted its functions in correlation to a specific ideology serving Soviet 
purposes and opposing Communist (Marxist-Leninist) versus Western (liberal) ideals for world 
construction. Seen from a Marxist viewpoint, the term “ideology” can be understood as 
communication for the ruling ideas of the ruling class. Ideology, in this regard, encompasses 
partiality or particular interests embraced or concealed by a particular formulation (Medhurst, 
1990, p. 131). 
It is worth noting, however, that the Soviet notion of propaganda differs significantly 




of the ideological Cold War, propaganda, as defined by the Oxford Dictionary, represents “the 
information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or 
point of view.”6 The Dictionary of the Russian Language defines it as “spreading in society an 
explanation of ideas, thoughts, knowledge or learnings.”7 The difference in the definitions is 
quite profound, as is the perception of different types of ideologically constructed worldviews 
and the role of journalists in them, as applied to Eastern and Western perspectives. If, in the 
former, journalists perceive their role as educators, the latter has the connotation of biased or 
misleading information.  
To achieve its goals, ideology, understood as communication for the ruling ideas of the 
ruling class, also necessitates corresponding propaganda techniques. In the context of Soviet 
journalism, such rhetorical techniques included “empty signifiers,” slogans, collectivisations, 
pejoratives, metaphors, and presuppositions in depicting the perceived – or manipulated – reality 
(Malykhina, 2014;  Pasti, 2005; Voltmer, 2000). In terms of journalistic style, the language used 
was usually elevated and abstract; openly biased; empathetic and emotionally rich; and employed 
linguistic strategies such as irony or ambiguous formulations to produce arguments (Von Seth, 
2011; Voltmer, 2000). Examining the interplay between rhetoric and ideology in his analysis of 
Marxist-Leninist theory, the American sociologist C. Wright Mills observes:  
 
Rhetoric and ideology limit choices and guide the decisions of men [and women]. 
For [they] are influenced in their use of the powers they possess, by the rhetoric 
they feel they must employ, and by the ideological coin in which they transact 
                                                          
 
6 Oxford Dictionary. Retrieved from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/propaganda.  





affairs with one another. The leaders as well as the led, even the hired mythmakers 
and hack apologists, are influenced by their own rhetoric of justification and the 
ideological consolidation that prevails (Mills, 1962, p. 27).  
 
In Newspeak: The Language of Soviet Communism, the French historian Françoise Thom 
(1989), drawing on Orwell’s idea of newspeak which represents a language created by a 
fictitious totalitarian state, refers to the language of the Soviet regime as newspeak or langue de 
bois (a wooden language). Thom stresses that the political language of the Soviet state performed 
as an antithesis to the “classical good style,” as represented by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (p. 47). 
As Thom explains it, the expression langue de bois describes any politicized idiom or style 
obfuscated by jargon (p. 14). In itself, newspeak is wholly vague, full of abstractions and 
tautology, and avoids precision. It is wooden because it does not convey any real content, and it 
is identical in content no matter the author or the subject. Each proposition unfolds a bias, while 
notions of time and aggression pervade the language. As Thom also points out, “the structure of 
communist texts is in itself as much a cliché as the figures of speech it carries” (p. 54). 
Communist langue de bois, therefore, represents, “a unique and vivid example of a language 
which cut itself off from thought, but has not died of the split; it has not died because it is 
artificially kept alive by totalitarian political power or by the ideology that envelops it” (p. 57).   
For decades the discursive weapons of the Cold War and Soviet newspeak were 
employed by appointed journalists-press agents, or so-called publicists, who in turn divided the 
world along the ideological lines of East versus West, in a reflection of the strained nature of 
United States-Soviet Union relations. This struggle was couched within corresponding yet 
ideologically charged communication as a way of achieving the aforementioned goals. Such 




and exaggerated, and “intended to influence the political environment and mobilise public 
opinion behind certain specific policies” (McNair, 2011, p. 180). Ultimately, it served the goals 
of propaganda.  
In accordance with its propaganda functions, as De Smaele (2010) points out, “newspaper 
distribution was ‘planned’ from the top down: ‘A Soviet citizen cannot simply buy or subscribe 
to the paper of his choice; he receives the paper that is specified for him according to plan’” (p. 
48). There were obligatory subscriptions according to Party membership, or working position. 
Thus, “the ‘most boring’ newspapers (such as Pravda or Izvestiia) were distributed in high 
numbers while the more popular ones (such as Vechernaya Moskva or Sovetskii Sport) circulated 
in reduced numbers” (De Smaele, 2010, p. 48). Information, as De Smaele points out, “was one 
of the most sought after commodities and therefore in high demand” (p. 48).  
According to the Soviet communist theory of the press, as discussed by Siebert et al. 
(1956), the role of journalists in Soviet Russia was to serve as collective agitators, propagandists, 
and organizers on behalf of the Communist Party. In this regard, the press was seen, along with 
other instruments of coercion, as an integral part of state power and party influence, as an 
instrument for unity, revelation and social control. The role of journalists as collective 
propagandists, agitators, and organizers was to follow the Party’s ideological “Right Line” and to 
propagate its views of “socialist construction” (p. 144).  
After the October revolution of 1917, the press in Soviet Russia became part of the state 
institutional apparatus, and the job of journalists was to convey, interpret and represent reality in 
accordance with the “Socialist perspective, with the result that ‘truth’ in reporting had nothing to 




to legitimize the political system. In Foucauldian terms, the role of journalists in Soviet Russia 
was to propagate the socialist “regime of truth.” As Foucault (1980) observes:  
 
Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: that is the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by 
which each is sanctioned the techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth, the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true (p. 131). 
 
In the Soviet context, the regime of truth could be reinterpreted as the regime of the Kremlin’s 
truth, since the newspeak of the state suggested neither deviation from, nor contradiction against 
the Kremlin’s dominant views. Journalists in the pro-Kremlin news media, then, acted more as 
propagandists for the only possible truth, rather than as dispassionate observers and critics. Any 
criticism seemed impossible, any deviation from the “Right line” – punishable.  
In order to survive, the regime of Soviet truth (which lasted more than 70 years) 
created its own methods of control. As Alexey Tikhomirov (2013) observes, one was 
through violence and terror, while another was based on the interplay between trust and 
distrust (p. 80). What Tikhomirov calls a regime of Soviet “forced trust” was based on 
simultaneously generating faith in the central power – by setting up channels for 
distributing it – and simultaneously maintaining a high level of generalized distrust (p. 




establishment of discipline in order to create a multi-layered social differentiation of the 
population, dividing it into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’” (p. 80).  
Conversely, the regime of forced trust “gave the individual a chance to escape from 
the oppressive feeling of distrust of the state and party, which offered a guarantee of 
protection and security, as well as access to material and symbolic resources for 
normalizing daily life” (Tikhomirov, 2013, p. 80). Thus, “forced trust was based on an 
“ethical-moral codex of honour that joined the state and the population together through 
bonds of mutual obligations, duty ay the rule of law, civil rights and well-functioning 
institutions” (p. 80).  
Paraphrasing the general belief that “a society cannot exist without trust,” 
Tikhomirov argues that the political order in Soviet Russia could not exist without 
distrust:  
 
Distrust formed a system of coordinates with its harsh rules of behaviour and 
rhetoric, cruel methods of control and oversight and its singular practices of 
inclusion and exclusion (…) In the formation of Soviet society’s political 
and social order, distrust was a key factor in making and conserving the 
emotional bonds between people and state (…) stigmatizing the ‘others’ in 
order to maintain the emotional regime of forced trust. Societies of distrust 
have a much greater potential for mobilizing the population negatively – 





The binary notions of trust and distrust were mobilized in perpetual motion by well-
established networks for control where journalists played a crucial role. These networks 
“regulated everyday life and produced the feeling that the existing order was accountable and 
predictable and was working well” (p. 84). Ironically, distrust became the mobilizing frame for 
Soviet society and crucial tool for submission to its artificially constructed regime of truth.  
Correspondingly, “the new regime demanded a renunciation of the rhetoric of the 
monarchy and a search for a new language for communication between society and the regime” 
(Tikhomirov, 2013, p. 89). As a result, the pre-Revolutionary concept of “the people” was 
transformed into “Soviet citizens” to semantically charge the individual with rights, obligations, 
and involvement into politics (p. 89). To further obtain the desired results, journalists resorted to 
what Tikhomirov refers to as a “dramaturgy of trust” or rhetorical practices such as publications 
of letters to the leaders, greetings such as “Dear,” biographical sketches, and specific emotional 
connectors aiming to build emotional bridges between the public and their leaders (p. 93). The 
propagated idea of fraternity and common family was another powerful tool for meaning 
construction (p. 93).  
As Becker (1999) also observes in his book on Soviet and Russian press coverage of the 
United States, the press in the Soviet Union was an instrument used to help the Communist Party 
to build Communism. It was a press “dominated by totalitarian discourse and committed to 
ideological struggle” (p. 2). It served as the prime instrument for the Party’s “social engineering” 
aiming to build Homo Sovieticus (p. 19). During the years of the Cold War – in particular under 
Gorbachev’s predecessors Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko – the ideological war with the 




The Cold War prescribed additional tasks to the propagandist function of Russian 
journalism – namely, the construction of the enemy image. It suggested an opposition between 
two identities – the Self (as the hero) and the Other (the enemy as the villain). However, it should 
be noted that such a construction was characteristic of the Western depictions of the Soviet 
Union as well.  
The Us versus Them opposition could be pinpointed as a dominating feature of Cold War 
discourse, from both Eastern and Western perspectives. As Stein (1989) suggests in his study of 
enemy images in American-Soviet relations, the two ideologically constructed adversaries were 
locked in a permanent “dance” (p. 480). The same author refers to the enemy images as “a 
cultural pair” and notes that self-definition was impossible without reference to the other (p. 
480). The image of the enemy, therefore, was a fundamental, “recurrent feature of a group’s own 
internal self-regulation” (p. 480). It gave politicians the power to persuade and manipulate 
people, in both the Eastern and Western spheres of influence, “without resorting to physical 
force” (Hazan, 1982, p. 5).  
The construction of the enemy image, from a Western point of view, is evident in 
Herman and Chomsky’s (2002) propaganda model. This model argues that the US news media 
used the ideology of anti-Communism to filter information and to frame Communism as “the 
ultimate evil” (p. 29). The enemy image served as a political-control mechanism in order to 
mobilize the population against an imagined threat or to serve domestic power interests.  
This is also illustrated in Entman’s (1991) study on the narratives of the Korean Flight 
007 (KAL) and Iran Air Incidents. It reveals the double standard in news reporting by showing 
that US news media portrayed the US downing of an Iranian plane in 1988 as a technical 




“brutal massacre” and the result of a “cold-blooded barbarous attack” (p. 22). Entman contends 
that such portrayals are illustrative of “the Cold War frames imposed on international affairs” (p. 
7). McNair (2011) also observes that the Cold War furnished the US and other Western 
countries, for most of the twentieth century, with an enemy or a threat posed by this enemy. 
Expressed in military or moral terms, it was frequently invoked in the service of domestic 
politics (p. 175).  
Representing the other side of the ideological struggle, the United States was constituted, 
as Becker (1999) contends, as the most important Other in the Soviet self-definition (p. 3). 
According to Becker, “the capitalist enemy played such a central role in Soviet thinking and 
discourse that changing images of the US reflect the process of breakdown of the officially 
imposed ideology and a re-evaluation of Soviet identity” (p. 4).  
Soviet journalists-propagandists resorted to supplementary Cold War propaganda 
techniques as well. Four of the most prominent, as defined by Barukh Hazan (1982) in his book 
on the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, were polarization, differentiation, 
flattery and sarcasm (p. 161). The polarization technique involved describing an issue as black 
or white, identifying “the forces of evil” and “forces of good” pinpointing the enemies, and 
connecting the issue in question with much broader universal principles and ideas (Hazan, 1982, 
p. 161). The differentiation technique adapted the propaganda message to specific characteristics, 
customs, circumstances or traditions. For example, covering the US boycott of the Olympic 
Games in Moscow in 1980, Radio Moscow referred to US domestic issues such as President 
Jimmy Carter’s declining popularity as the real reasons behind the Olympic boycott (p. 161). In 
other words, the boycott was represented as an integral part of Carter’s foreign policy aimed 




Differentiation can be tied in with another tactic known as whataboutism. It suggests that 
any criticism of the Soviet Union during the Cold War needed to be put in an historical, political 
or other context with the reverse question “What about …,” as invoked in relation to US actions 
in a given country. It was used as a self-protection tactic aiming not to justify Soviet actions but 
rather to criticize US ones. The flattery technique, as an exception, was rarely used by the Soviet 
Union. The irony and sarcasm technique, on the contrary was, according to Hazan, one of 
Moscow’s favorite techniques to employ in its propaganda campaigns. To illustrate it, the author 
provides an example from 1980 when the information disseminated by the Soviet wire service 
TASS portrayed President Carter and his advisors “as a bunch of idiots” trying to present the 
boycott of the Olympics “as a huge success by fooling around with a computer” (p. 163).  
Drawing on various examples of propaganda provided by Anur Shah (2005) in the study 
War, Propaganda and the Media, some common tactics of Cold War discourses could be 
summarized as follows: presenting the self as a hero and the other as a villain; demonizing the 
enemy; using selective stories; relying on partial facts or referring to historical context as 
justification; reinforcing reasons and motivations to act due to a pre-constructed threat; relying 
on “experts” to provide insights into the situation; resorting to a narrow range of discourse 
describing an issue within the framework of “our good” and “their bad” attitudes.  
In sum, Cold War discourse refers to what many scholars define as Manicheism: a system 
based on dualism or the supposed primeval conflict between light and darkness.8 In journalism 
studies, a Manichean paradigm suggests that one side is good and the other is evil. One very 
important characteristic of Manicheism, as discussed by Francoise Thom (1989) in her analysis 
                                                          
 





of the language of Soviet Communism, is that the basic dualism has another effect that is no less 
important: the idea that “no word is innocent” (p. 28). Rather, each concept is defined by its 
contrary, and lies between Communism and its enemy (p. 29).  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist regime in 1989, the Cold War 
was declared to be over. Since then, substantial scholarship has examined the dynamics of the 
news media-power relationship in Russia, with a focus on one or more of the following 
interconnected themes: democratization, citizen engagement, media and ownership (Voltmer, 
2010; Zassoursky, 2004; Mickiewicz, 1997); the concept of glasnost’ or openness, new and old 
journalistic practices, censorship and self-censorship (Goban-Klas, 1989; McNair, 1994; Pasti, 
2005; Simons and Strovsky, 2006; Voltmer, 2000; Oates, 2007); and the applicability of Western 
models on the Russian media beyond Siebert et al.’s Four Theories of the Press (De Smaele, 
1999; Becker, 2004; Christians et al., 2009; Roudakova, 2012; Voltmer, 2012; Vartanova, 2012).  
This scholarship suggests that structural changes have occurred in the Russian media 
field since 1989. The communist media system – understood as the intentional interaction among 
politicians and journalists aiming to address purposefully specific politics to the public – was 
declared to be history (McNair, 2011). As McNair (1988) observes, “with the departure of the 
‘old guard’ in the Soviet leadership – Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko – the USSR began to 
develop a new approach to propaganda and information policy, and to use the western media 
more effectively for the propagation of Soviet viewpoints” (p. 130). The press was reshaped 
according to the newly introduced policy of glasnost’ which was set up in the early 1980s, but is 
mostly identified with Mikhail Gorbachev. The principles of glasnost’ were formally introduced 




The new policy was part of a much deeper process of change that took place within the 
Soviet Union – a process called perestroika (restructuring). The aim of perestroika, as McNair 
(1988) sees it, was “to equip and refit the Soviet economy, to make it competitive in the race 
with the west” (p. 131). As McNair suggests, “the ideological powerhouse of the drive for 
reform” was to make the press more open to the public, “peeling away the layers of bureaucracy 
and secrecy which have dogged it since Stalin’s time” (p. 131). The policy of glasnost’, in this 
sense (usually translated as openness) was at the heart of the reforms. It aimed to provide not 
only meaningful information but to discuss publicly issues that were never before imagined as 
open for discussion. It was not only policy of openness to the public; rather it meant “voiceness” 
or speaking out loud to the public (p. 131).      
As a result, the press during glasnost’ became aware of people’s needs, addressing the 
pressing issues of the day rather than legitimizing the regime of Kremlin-generated truth. The 
adoption of a new media law in 1990 inaugurated “revolutionary changes” for Russian 
journalism: official censorship was abolished, journalists became independent of the publishers 
and private ownership of media outlets was permitted (Von Seth, 2011, p. 55). However, as 
Voltmer (2000) argues, Gorbachev’s notion of glasnost’ was “radical, but not revolutionary” 
since he never granted the press a truly independent status (p. 472). Instead, “similar to his 
predecessors, he regarded the media as instruments for mobilizing mass support, though in this 
case for the goals of perestroika” (Voltmer, 2000, p. 472).  
The post-Soviet Russian news media, however, were reorganized according to liberal 
principles, reshaped into pluralist and independent organs according to “the fourth estate model” 
(Christians et al., 2009, p. 12). Russia adopted the principles of a market economy, privatization 




(2012) defines as “more objective reporting” (p. 121). Accordingly, the journalistic role switched 
from instrumental to autonomous, oriented with a dedication to a public service ideal whereby 
the role of the audience was redefined as active participant in public affairs rather than observer 
“in the theater state of politics” (Zassoursky, 2004, p. 20-23). As Christians et al. (2009) note, 
after 1989 Russia experienced its “golden age” of journalism (p. 12).  
However, the golden age of Russian journalism did not last long. By the mid-1990s, as 
a consequence of privatization and economic pressures, big media groups took control over 
Russian media. As Voltmer (2000) observes, “the newly evolving oligarchs in Russia 
discovered the power of public opinion and started to supplement their financial empires with 
media empires” (p. 473). As a result, journalistic autonomy was curtailed and restricted, 
whereas objective reporting was replaced by biased editorials, pre-ordered copies or hidden 
advertising (Pasti, 2005). While the 1990s witnessed a plurality of voices, some even critical 
of the Kremlin, the reality was that the news media remained under state control or in the 
hands of regime-friendly corporations and oligarchs. Since then, as Christians et al. (2009) 
note, “no post-Communist theory of the press has emerged” (p. 12).  
Thus, despite ongoing criticism of the Four Theories of the Press the work remains a 
major point of reference for a significant number of authors trying to tackle the post-Soviet 
Russian media system, or the relationship between politicians, journalists, and the public. As 
a result, most of the Western classifications in Four Theories, even modified, retain the old 
ideological dichotomy between East and West, creating further ideological conflicts and 
mutual misunderstanding. Drawn from the post-communist legacy, the old patterns of “the 
overarching framework of the Cold War,” however, are confronted by new challenges 




Communist regime in Russia and Eastern Europe (Christians et al., 2009, p. 15). Moreover, 
as Voltmer (2010) demonstrates, “the experiences of the past decades have shown that 
democracy is not a one-way road” (p. 137). In practice, different democratic models are 
shaped by different political, economic and cultural factors; therefore, every case deserves 
critical scrutiny and contextualization.  
With the arrival of Vladimir Putin to the Russian Presidency in 2000, the role of the 
media became extremely important in achieving a new form of officially imposed ideology, 
re-oriented to what Putin has referred to as the Russian Idea in his Millennium Manifesto 
“Russia at the Turn of the Millennium” (Putin, 1999).  
Putin’s Russian Idea rested on notions of patriotism, national pride, social solidarity, 
and a strong state. To achieve it, the Kremlin resumed control over a significant number of 
media outlets. Their task was to exercise a new form of soft power – or newspeak – 
throughout the news media in general. The aim of this newly evolved newspeak was to create 
an image of what Zassoursky (2004) describes as “Great Russia” (p. 33). 
In After Newspeak: Language Culture and Politics in Russia from Gorbachev to 
Putin, Michael S. Gorham (2014) traces a history of the politics of official Russian language 
usage from Gorbachev to Putin. Gorham begins with the premise that periods of rapid and 
radical change both shape and are shaped by language. He demonstrates the linkage of 
language and politics in everything from everyday life to the speech patterns of the country’s 
leaders, the blogs of its bureaucrats, and the official programs promoting the use of Russian in 
the so-called Near Abroad (the former Soviet republics). He also investigates whether Internet 
communication and new media technologies have helped to consolidate a more vibrant 




technologies manipulated by the Kremlin.  
In his analysis of the 2007 episode of the “Direct Line,” for instance, Gorham (2014) 
describes Putin’s appeal as:  
 
[A] multimedia extravaganza usually staged in the final weeks of the year, the 
“Direct Line” attempted not only to install a “confidence of community”, to use 
Anderson’s term, but also to project, through language and images, a coherent and 
appealing collective identity, or “cognitive map” of the Russian nation as a whole 
(p. 140).9  
 
The “Direct Line,” thus, offers “some of the clearest and most coherent portraits of Putin’s 
vision for a discursive construction of national identity” and a new Russia in “all its vastness, 
diversity, unity, and might” (Gorham, 2014, p. 140). As Gorham observes, it does so by 
employing multiple layers of framing – technological, geographic, historical, demographic, 
and linguistic – in order to transmit an imagined community which is: (1) historically rich, 
geographically expansive, and demographically diverse; (2) actively and demographically 
engaged in the political process; and (3) reverential towards its president looking to him as to 
a merciful tsar.  
Another interesting observation Gorham points to is the Russian government’s fear of 
new media resulting in legislative moves aimed to impose a “cyber curtain” (p. 189).  As the 
author puts it, as a result of “the government’s fear of the power of the new media,” it is 
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taking measures to “isolate Russian cyberspace from the global network” by creating a 
“national cyberzone,” a “sovereign Internet” that not only makes the space “more Russian” 
but (more importantly) “more state-affiliated” (Gorham, 2014, p. 189). 
All of these efforts, according to Gorham, demonstrate a concerted strategy on the part 
of the Russian President and the ruling United Russia Party to control the more liberal forms 
of glasnost’ and free speech. Even if these efforts cannot mute the voice of the opposition on 
the Internet completely, through legal and economic measures they compromise it enough to 
make it a space more feared by the networked opposition. It is evident, therefore, as Gorham 
illustrates, that Putin’s preference leans toward the old system of news media control as well 
as “in inoculating the virtual public space of all serious political debate” (p. 190). As a result, 
“the vast majority of Russian Internet users still spend most of their time online networking 
and entertaining themselves rather than fomenting revolution” (p. 190). 
The nostalgic attitudes toward the Soviet past, with its practices of coercion and 
control, clearly demonstrate that “the pendulum of history was again gathering speed” with a 
vigorous reform of the ruling apparatus and free media, the aim of which was “perestroika of 
the media-political system” (Zassoursky, 2004, p. 33) and creation of a new form of 
newspeak. Referring to Foucault, the aim of the newly evolved newspeak is to create a regime 
of truth through specific discourses that are widely accepted and reproduced by the news 
media while remaining under the control of the ruling apparatus. Chapter Four of this thesis 
will demonstrate what the features of these discourses are.  
What is evident here is that despite the changes following the fall of Communism in 
1989, one particular feature of Putin’s regime has been a resurgence in the old type of media 




image of “Great Russia,” Russianness, or any kind of imagined Russian identity. This ties in with 
the argument that post-Soviet Russian journalism has occupied a role that has not been primarily 
one of neutrality, but above all designed for “upbringing” and “educative” intentions (Von Seth, 
2011, p. 55). The former Kremlin PR agent Sergei Yastrzhembskii’s words clearly demonstrate 
this instrumentalization: “When the nation mobilises its forces to solve some task, [this] imposes 
obligations on everyone, including the media” (as cited in Simons and Strovsky, 2006, p. 202).  
In a similar vein, journalists in Putin’s Russia perceive their role in a kind of alignment 
with Lipmann’s view of journalists as agents for the political elite, rather than as watchdogs of 
those in power (Voltmer, 2000; Pasti, 2005; Malykhina, 2014). As Malykhina (2014) argues, in 
contemporary Russian journalism, both the heritage of the Soviet journalistic tradition and the 
years with increasing freedom of the press are evident (p. 67). Scholars examining Russian 
journalistic practices refer to two generations of journalists in post-Soviet Russia – old and new – 
conducting journalism in a different way but unified by lack of objectivity, government 
interference and harassment of media outlets; lack of journalistic professionalism; and working 
in an atmosphere of violence against journalists (Malykhina, 2014; Oates, 2007; Pasti, 2005).  
Pasti’s (2005) analysis of the two generations of contemporary Russian journalists, for 
instance, reveals continuing dominance of the “publicist” role of journalists inherited from the 
Soviet era, which represents highly subjective reporting in contrast with the Western ideals of 
objective news reporting and plurality of voices. Ironically, however, Simons and Strovsky 
(2006) argue that, since Putin came into power “political rhetoric has mostly framed the mass 
media as the protectors of democracy” (p. 201). In this regard, it should be noted that scholars 
examining post-Soviet media-power dynamics seem to lack coherence in their search for a label 




captured between new and old Soviet and post-Soviet reality. Part of the objective of this thesis 
is to bring a measure of coherence to the contemporary Russian journalism-media matrix. 
Iris Marion Young (2000), in her discussion on democracy and justice, defines two 
models of democracy in contemporary political theory – aggregative and deliberative. Both 
models require some basics of democratic governance such as the rule of law, voting, and 
freedom of speech, assembly, and association (p. 18). Drawing on this basic concept of 
democratic rule, in theory Russia possesses all the characteristics of being so. In practice, 
however, Russia represents a unique reality.  
The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation describes Russia as a democratic 
federal state with a republican form of government under the rule of law (Art. 1). Art. 29 (5) 
stipulates that the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship.10 
On one hand, the Russian specifics hinder the acceptance of the Western models; on the other, 
however, they encourage a specific Russian adaptation of the liberal-democratic ideals that 
shape an indigenous Russian system.  
As noted by Roudakova (2012), several attempts to explain different democratic 
regimes, using liberal arguments, were proposed throughout the years after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Most of them fell into the typologies of hybrid regimes defining the Russian 
reality as “illiberal democracy,” “delegative democracy,” “competitive authoritarianism,” or 
“multi party authoritarianism” (Roudakova, 2012, p. 247). A common feature of these hybrid 
regimes is the existence of competitive and reasonably free elections, but a weak 
institutionalization of the rule of law and civil liberties (Voltmer, 2012, p. 241).  
                                                          
 





One recurring element of what Zakaria terms “illiberal democracy”, for instance, is the 
restriction of media independence and the resulting limitations of media pluralism (as cited in 
Voltmer, 2012, p. 241). However, it could be argued that the model of illiberal democracy 
partially reflects the Russian reality since there are restrictions on media independence even as 
it coexists with media pluralism. Therefore, the notion of “delegative democracy” seems more 
applicable to Russia. Behind this concept lies the assumption that democracy flourishes in 
countries with presidential systems of government. In delegative democracies presidents 
represent themselves as “the head” of the nation. As such, presidents use state-owned media as 
a tool for boosting their own vision of patriotism and agenda-setting.  
Another outstanding feature of Putin’s regime, along with his preference for the old type 
of media control, is the implementation of many former Soviet discursive practices in achieving 
the Russian Idea. In this light, Svitlana Malykhina compares Putin with Stalin, by pointing out 
that “the authoritarian tendencies in Russian society during Putin’s presidency brought back (…) 
Stalin’s rhetoric” (Malykhina, 2014, p. 75). Comparing expressions in some of the Russian 
mainstream newspapers such as Izvestiia, Moskovskii Komsomolets, and Zavtra from 2010 to 
2012, for instance, Malykhina’s analysis clearly demonstrates reproduction of Stalin’s phrases in 
contemporary Russian news media discourse. As observed by Grenoble, cited in Malykhina’s 
book: 
 
Soviet leaders knew that language counts, that it is a crucial part of both a nation’s 
and individual’s identity, and it could be manipulated to serve as a powerful tool for 




replicated on the deeper layers of the doxa’s frame, it shows a high frequency of 
powerful Stalinist dicta, which acquired special status (p. 76) 
 
The specifics of post-Soviet rhetoric, its propaganda techniques and the interaction between 
Soviet and post-Soviet media discourses, however, attracted comparatively little scholarly 
attention. In this regard, as the following chapters aim to demonstrate, Cold War discourses 
provide a useful framework to explore its features and continuity, with all of the attendant 
meanings as they pertain to contemporary Russian journalism, values, and Russian culture as a 
whole. 











Discourse and the Language of Izvestiia  
 
This chapter outlines the methodology used to examine the language mobilized by 
Izvestiia in both Soviet and post-Soviet times as discourse – that is to say as a rhetorical tool 
conveying particular meanings in order to create particular perceptions and, finally, to convince 
readers of the rightness of particular political position. Taking a before-and-after comparative 
approach, the study employs a Cold War framework to examine and correlate discursive 
similarities and differences. In doing so, it contextualizes the role of journalism, then and now, 
from an explicitly linguistic angle applying the framing approach as a type of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA). This works not only as a method of research, but also as a broader theoretical 
framework. The importance of the linguistic aspect of the analysis originates in a non-judgmental 
stance that does not view journalists working for pro-Kremlin news media as merely ideological 
machines. Rather, the language employed in press texts is viewed semiotically as symbolic and 
interpretative of changes. 
This form of discourse analysis is based on the social constructionist view that considers 
news media texts as tools for creating particular meanings and a particular kind of constructed 
reality that seeks to inform, form, and maintain social practices. As Malykhina (2014) puts it, 
one of the functions of media discourse is to understand communication, memory, and identity 
(p. 2). In this regard, the general contention here is that no word is innocent and journalistic 
language choices reflect particular identity choices at a particular time or historical moment.  
Since the study is about using language to convince people, it is principally concerned 




Izvestiia’s texts in Soviet times, particularly in covering the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 
1968; and second, by comparing them with the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the 
study asks what kind of residual Soviet discourses can be identified in the more contemporary 
texts. The overarching objective lies in identifying the frames and techniques applied by Izvestiia 
in constructing news stories, then and now, in order to convey particular meanings to readers and 
influence public opinion in two historically different times.  
As this thesis argues, a qualitative analysis of the rhetorical tools in press texts can reveal 
not only general social values, but also how they are reflected in journalistic practices. Following 
the basic premise that language and journalistic texts serve as barometers of political and 
sociocultural changes, the language deployed in Izvestiia’s texts, therefore, can be examined in 
correlation with the “progress” or “retrogression” of Russian journalism since Communist times.   
To draw the comparative perspectives into a dialogue, the samples contrast and compare 
texts from two case studies, each situated within the context of Cold War rhetoric. First is the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which took place in the midst of the real Cold War 
and second, the crisis over Ukraine in 2014 referred to as a new Cold War. Respectively, the 
sample comprises two time-frames – 1968 and 2014 – between the months of January and 
August. In each case, conflict began approximately at the beginning of the year, gained 
momentum over the following six months, and reached a peak during the summer months. The 
invasion of Czechoslovakia took place on August 20-21, 1968, whereas the tension between 
Russia and the West over Ukraine rose to a crescendo after the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight 
MH17 near the Ukrainian-Russian border on July 17, 2014.  
Izvestiia was selected as the main source of analysis for several reasons. Because of its 




transformation in terms of journalistic practices. Its pro-Kremlin line makes Izvestiia an 
important source of evidence for what the State perception of the world was like in Soviet and 
post-Soviet times. Finally, because of its consistent and stable position as a national broadsheet 
and opinion leader it has maintained a certain resonance with the Russian public (in contrast to 
Pravda, for example, which lost its influence over the years following the collapse of the 
Communist regime).  
 The selected items, 195 for Czechoslovakia and 240 for Ukraine, were broadly assigned 
to categories corresponding to different types of journalistic practice: factual news, opinion 
pieces (editorials), interviews or official statements, i.e. statements of official representatives – 
presidents, party leaders, politicians and so forth, in both 1968 and 2014. In the case of 
Czechoslovakia, factual news stories were chosen as such based on attribution to TASS, the 
Soviet wire service, or Pravda, the flagship newspaper of the Communist Party. Such attribution 
typically appeared in the headline or at the end of the text. In the example of Ukraine, a story 
was considered to be factual, if it reported something new without the inclusion of a journalist’s 
personal opinion. In the case of Izvestiia’s reportage on Ukraine, however, the identification of 
purely factual stories is complicated since all stories carry a by-line, none originate from a wire 
service, and virtually every contribution can be seen to reflect reporter bias or opinion.  As an 
example, the breaking “news” about the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 on July 17, 
2014, in the online edition of Izvestiia, appeared under the headline “The Crash of Malaysian 
Boeing Takes the Lives of 298 People” (“Крушение малайзийского Boeing унесло жизни 298 




Destruction of the Liner as a Planned Provocation of Kyiv” (“Руководство Новороссии 
считает уничтожение лайнера спланированной провокацией Киева”).11 
In terms of editorial opinion, material from both 1968 and 2014 was selected based on the 
presence of authorship, or a by-line providing the name of the author and his or her profession or 
area of expertise. As the following chapter will reveal, opinion pieces were often communicated 
through “experts” identified as composers, journalists, writers, or professors. Generally, such 
items were spread across Izvestiia’s pages from 1968 but found mainly in an identified 
“Opinion” section in the online version of Izvestiia from 2014. Many of the selected items from 
2014, however, were also spread across other sections, such as “First strip” (“Первая полоса“), 
“World,” “Russia,” “Russia-News” (“Россия-Новости”), “Russia-Ukraine,” “Crimea,” “Russia-
World” depending on the newsworthiness of the story and its emotional appeal.  
The examined items from 1968 were accessed at the microfilm archive at McGill Library 
in Montreal in the summer of 2014.  All the scanned articles were gathered together in 
chronological order and transferred to a USB disk for convenience, then to my computer in two 
separate folders: one, from January to June 1968; second, from July to December 1968.  While 
reading the items, the decision for their selection was based on the presence of key words, such 
as Prague, Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ЧССР, the official name of 
Czechoslovakia from 1960 until shortly after the Velvet Revolution in 1989), Warsaw Pact, 
Alexander Dubček (First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia elected in January 
1968, who started the reforms known as the Prague Spring), and Ludvík Svoboda (who was 
elected President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in March 1968). After a second careful 
reading of the selected items, certain repetitiveness in terms of language, themes and frames was 
                                                          
 




identified, especially after the invasion in August 1968. Thus, and because of the large number of 
initially chosen texts, a decision was made to shorten the examined period from January to 
August 1968.  
On a similar basis, the selection of data to be examined for 2014 was made based on 
presence of key words such as Ukraine, Crimea, Kyiv, Donetsk, Maidan Nezalezhnosti (the 
Independence Square in Kyiv where the protests against ousted Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovich first started), Viktor Yanukovich, and Petro Poroshenko (the current President of 
Ukraine). It is worth noting here that in terms of logistics, the data archiving of the items from 
1968 was easier than the process of archiving from 2014. Surprisingly or not, it turned out that 
sampling online content for qualitative content analysis represents a huge challenge. First, 
Izvestiia’s website changes within days and sometimes hours. As a result, the online content 
increasingly expands the corpus for potential sampling. Due to this highly fluid state of data 
expansion, a decision was made to resort to more stable data available in the Izvestiia Digital 
Archive. The Archive was accessed free of charge through the East View database at McGill 
Library. Thus, additional articles were added to the initial sample downloaded from Izvestiia’s 
website (http://izvestia.ru/) based on further searches done using the assigned key words and 
identified thematic sections. Afterwards, all the articles – 342 items dated from January to 
August 2014 – were saved, in chronological order, along with the date of their publication. After 
a second reading in the early staged of the analysis, the sample was reduced to 240 articles.  
In the process of reading some key words, linguistic features, phrases or references to 
particular socio-cultural phenomena were highlighted, mainly in the headlines and the leading 
paragraphs of the selected texts, and brief notes were taken. They were revisited at later stages of 




themes was assembled categorising the stories. The pathetic/emotional category listed stories in 
line with the Kremlin’s objectives with references to the historical past, great victories, 
anniversaries, geographical space, or common Soviet / post-Soviet values.12 Aggressive/martial 
identified stories that intended to engender a sense of anxiety or fear, while attacking implicitly 
or explicitly the Other as a reason for action. Abstract stories were those that did not convey any 
particular meaning or new information; rather, they resembled a philosophical-sounding 
discussion. Positive stories generally focused on themes connected to public holidays, economic 
development, progress in a broad sense, while negative stories were based on themes such as 
social problems, conflicts, and war.13 Critical and Alarming stories were added to the 2014 
categories based on the repetitive appearance of criticism addressing the need to remember the 
Soviet past as a compelling symbol for Russian greatness.14  
Of course, a number of themes were interrelated and mutually complementary. For 
instance, aggressive articles such as those mobilizing bellicose rhetoric against a particular threat 
could be categorized as both aggressive, negative, and critical. However, aspects of aggressive 
articles could also be categorized as positive, since the general theme of progress or 
economic/military development in 1968 is quite often represented by juxtaposing it with a 
particular threat.  The initial classification, however, was made for the sake of methodological 
clarity, based on the dominant tone of the article, and as a starting point for further analysis.  
In both its broad and specific analyses the thesis regards media texts as tools for creating 
particular meanings. For this reason it is useful to examine in detail theoretical ground that 
                                                          
 
12 Since “pathetic” has several meanings, it should be noted that here, as in the following chapters, I use the term in a 
specific, more archaic way, defined by the Oxford dictionary as “Relating to the emotions.” See 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/pathetic. Such a usage-meaning has to do more with moving a 
reader to evoke pride, instead of arousing contemptuous pity. 
13 See Appendix 2. 




justifies the application of the method to Russian news texts and the discourses they contain. 
Since the study is about using language to convince people in two different sociocultural 
contexts – Soviet and post-Soviet – the choice was made to mobilize key concepts from a variety 
of theorists seeking to draw a line between language, press texts, and the broader Russian 
context.  
In The Language of Newspapers, Mark Conboy (2010) defines language as “a thoroughly 
social activity and newspapers extend that activity beyond the confines of face-to-face discourse 
to an extended, imagined community of kinship based on nation” (p. 3). Newspapers thus 
materialize that identity “quite literally onto the page” (p. 3). As for journalistic language, it 
denotes agency and power – it is partisan and never neutral. As Smith and Higgins (2013) 
suggest, “Journalism can only ever strive to be neutral or objective, and linguistic analysis can 
help to uncover the strategies and pitfalls of this endeavour” (p. 5). Furthermore, “language is an 
instrument that is shaped according to material circumstances and the purposes it needs to serve. 
Language is a medium of power and can be used to legitimize inequalities and unjust social 
relations for political ends. It can thus be used to empower as well as disempower” (p. 5). 
Conboy (2010) touches on this point:  
 
Journalism is defined in each era by its particular engagement with politics, 
technology, economics and culture. Dahlgren is one leading commentator who 
appreciates this diversity and stresses that the ‘cultural discourse’ (1988:51) of 
journalism is not simply informational but a part of a broader set of symbolic 





Seeing Izvestiia’s language as a medium of power, an important question occurs: How 
does this medium succeed in its attempts to convince its readers of the rightness of a political 
position? As a starting theoretical argument, the answer could be found in the notion of the 
dialogical structure of communication, which is central to Mikhail Bakhtin’s work (1986/2013); 
that is, Izvestiia builds a sense of dialogue with its readers by relying on particular culturally 
bound rhetorical clues to convey meaning. Drawing on Saussure’s differentiation between 
langue and parole, or linguistic meaning as a relationship between “general system” and 
particular “performance,” Bakhtin’s concept of communication may be understood as an 
accumulation of senses through particular utterances or speech acts constructed of words and 
conveyed through specific speech genres. The Russian genre of ocherk, for instance, defined as a 
“kind of journalistic essay” by Voltmer (2000) represents a uniquely Russian journalistic genre 
characterized by “in-depth discussion of a particular problem in which the author expresses his 
or her own thoughts and emotions and aims to evoke the emotions of the reader” (p. 478). Such 
emotional appeals represent a central tool for building dialogue during Soviet and post-Soviet 
times.  
According to Bakhtin (1986/2013), genres may be regarded as the central mechanisms of 
dialogue, “the drive belts from the history of society to the history of language” (p. 65). He 
argues that all utterances take place within unique historical situations, while at the same time 
contain memory traces or earlier usages. In this way, genres reflexively mediate between past 
and present. Izvestiia’s texts – in both 1968 and 2014 – for example, draw upon historical genres 
and techniques, such as philosophical reflections, when discussing political issues or references 
to historically and culturally embedded symbols that infer shared knowledge. The objective, 




understandings. Consequently, in order to be translated or decoded such texts require particular 
knowledge or context. They cannot be easily understood by a Western reader, for instance, in the 
same way as a Russian reader would be unlikely to understand the meaning of PBJ (Peanut 
Butter and Jelly) without referring to a dictionary of American slang.  
The term intertextuality, therefore, is crucial in comprehending the dialogical or 
discursive character of the text. As posited by Julia Kristeva, such intertextuality suggests the 
need to examine media texts not only by drawing on their purely linguistic dimensions, but by 
identifying the diffused, figurative, and culturally bound sense-making power within them.  
Kristeva draws upon Bakhtin’s conceptual ground in Word, Dialogue and Novel, where she 
defines intertextuality as “a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation 
of another” (Kristeva, 1986, p. 85). As Bakhtin also observes, intertextuality is inherent in 
language as part of its comprehensibility:  
 
The speaker is not, after all, the first speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal 
silence of the universe. (…) He presupposes not only the existence of the language 
system he is using, but also the existence of preceding utterances – his own and 
others’ – with which his given utterance enters into one kind of relation of another 
(builds on them, polemicizes with them, or simply presumes that they are already 
known to the listener) (p. 124). 
 
Or, the transcription of a text suggests a transcription “of a special kind of dialogue: the complex 




newspaper language seen as discourse could be understood as a particular expression of the 
semiotic nature of human communication.  
The aforementioned quotations exemplify the Russian intellectual position toward the 
notion of discourse which is essential to understanding how Russian news “consumers” garner 
meaning from what they read by relying on an almost sub-conscious, autonomic understanding 
of the connection between language and culture. Respectively, both the Soviet and post-Soviet 
discursive regimes insert themselves into this cultural-linguistic matrix to exercise control over 
readers’ consciousness. In both of the periods under discussion Izvestiia is full of emotionally 
rich outbursts that connect directly to notions of a common Russian history, or a sense of duty, 
gratitude, shared cultural values, or the “Unity of Hearts.”   
A resonance of the Bakhtinian argument for intertextual analysis as a necessary 
component of linguistic analysis can be found in Norman Fairclough’s (1995) assertion that 
intertextuality is nothing less than the dependence of texts upon societal and historical discursive 
formations (p. 188). The term discourse, as introduced by Fairclough (1995) and with reference 
to Foucault regards discursive acts as “a social construction of reality, a form of knowledge” (p. 
18). In this sense, discourse refers not only to language itself but also to sets of social and 
cultural practices. The aim of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as employed here, is, 
therefore, to combine Bakhtinian ideas with Western views of text and context, to scrutinize the 
context of the way language is used by approaching it as a form of social practice and 
knowledge.  
Proceeding from this line of thought, discourse, according to Foucault (1980) is not only 
the expression of social practice, it is also intrinsically correlated with the notion of power. Since 




discourse is used to regulate ways of thinking and acting. In doing so, language, through the 
operation of discourse, plays a central role in maintaining social control. Within such a 
discursive environment, the public can be seen as not only informed but also easily manipulated. 
In this regard, considering newspaper language as discourse – especially in the Russian 
institutional model – enables us “to view news production and dissemination as creating new 
forms of power as well as new forms of access to representation” (Conboy, 2010, p. 10).  
In order to illustrate the different operational levels of discourse it is useful to examine, 
the use of word “comrade” (товарищ) as employed by Izvestiia in the Soviet context. This 
culturally invented term is charged with layers of meaning: first, it indicates a political position; 
second, it serves as a salutation; third, it conveys a sense of belonging with respect to a particular 
class. Discursively, therefore, the word “comrade” can only be understood in context and by the 
way it institutionalizes and regulates ways of thinking and acting. In a particular discursive 
context the salutation “Dear comrades” might suggest a positive intention such as greeting the 
Soviet working people on the occasion of May 1, International Workers’ Day. In a different 
context, salutation “Dear comrades,” addressed to the Czech representatives deviating from the 
Kremlin’s line in their attempts for liberalization reforms in 1968, could be seen as a political 
warning. In an appeal to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
published on July 18, prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the friendly salutation “Dear 
comrades,” for example, was followed by “deep anxiety” (глубокое беспокойство) regarding 
“the offensive of the reactions patronized by imperialism against your party and the foundations 
of the social order in Czechoslovakia” (“Поддерживаемое империализмом наступление 
реакции против вашей партии и основ общественного строя ЧССР,” 18.07.1968 ).  The 




connotes a reference to the Soviet past, whereas Westerner unpacking this particular code would 
likely see it as a signifier of Communist ideology. The process of applying CDA, therefore, 
involves looking at choices of words in order to discover the underlying discourse(s) and 
ideologies within the context (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p. 20). 
To do so, this thesis employs an articulated method involving Critical Discourse Analysis 
and Framing analysis in order to illustrate the discursive practices (and ideologies buried in texts) 
of Soviet and post-Soviet Izvestiia. In particular, it adopts and applies Norman Fairclough’s 
(1995) three-dimensional analytical framework that integrates three levels: the textual, the 
interpersonal, and a wider societal context. In other words, Fairclough’s analytical framework 
includes text, discursive practice, and sociocultural practice. Indeed, this thesis applies what 
Malykhina (2014) refers to as a “framing approach as a type of CDA” (p. 16).  
This theoretical framework, offers a rich method for revealing the specifics of Russian 
discursive practices and, for the purposes of this thesis, understanding the way Izvestiia 
constructs any kind of unified or shared meaning. The goal is to understand news media 
discourses as part of a set of broader social practices that involve not only production but also 
interpretation of media texts by situating them in a particular historical and sociocultural 
framework, thus revealing their part in the broader construction of the unified Soviet or post-
Soviet Russian imaginaries.  
Drawing on Fairclough’s three-dimensional analytical framework, the first level of 
analysis – linguistic analysis – seeks to identify the explicit lexical and stylistic features of 
Izvestiia’s texts as “symbolic devices for meaning construction” (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 58). 
The analysis is substantiated by the News Framing Theory whose key theoretical postulate 




of a perceived reality (…) in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for 
the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52).  
For example, in the way Izvestiia frames the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the 
word “invasion” (вторжение) is never mentioned. Rather, the Kremlin’s intention to send tanks 
into Prague is portrayed as an act against “counter-revolutionary” (контрреволюционные) 
forces. This serves to build, metaphorically, the sense of increasing panic and anxiety. In the 
same vein, to legitimize the Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, Izvestiia employes 
the same threatening factor of “counter-revolution” (контрреволюция) and “coup d’état” 
(госпереворот). In both cases, salience is given to the sense of a threat against “fraternal people” 
(братские народы) who need to be protected, in order to give legitimacy to the Kremlin’s 
decision to enter foreign territory.  
With regard to manipulative strategies journalists employ over people’s consciousness, 
especially in times of conflict, analysis of frames is of particular importance since it “illuminates 
the precise way in which [such] influence over human consciousness is exerted by the transfer 
(or communication) of information from one location – such as a speech, utterance, news report, 
or novel-to that consciousness” (Entman, 1993, p. 51-52). Providing the Cold War as an 
example, the same author suggests that frames have at least four locations in the communication 
process: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture (p. 52).  
 
Communicators make conscious or unconscious framing judgments in deciding 
what to say, guided by frames (often called schemata) that organize their belief 




of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and 
sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments. (…) 
The culture is the stock of commonly invoked frames; in fact, culture might be 
defined as the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the 
discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping (Entman, 1993, p. 52-
53).  
 
In the Izvestiia texts examined for this thesis, such cultural frames are widely used and 
reproduced. In 1968, for instance, they usually refer to the glorious victory of the Soviet army 
over Nazi German Fascism, or to the heroic fight of the Soviet army on Czech territory. The 
triumph of Marxist-Leninist ideology is another common and repetitive frame throughout the 
examined period. In the same vein, in 2014 the Russian Idea is built on a set of common frames, 
discursively expressed, through a stock of commonly shared keywords referring to Russian 
“greatness” (“величие”), “reasonableness” (“разумность”) and “will for justice and peace” 
(“воля к справедливости и мира”).  
 As employed here, framing analysis focuses on lexical and stylistic choices. Rhetorical 
strategies were identified including: metaphors, epithets, presuppositions (taken for granted 
assumptions based on shared culture and knowledge, common beliefs and values); catchphrases 
and pejoratives (derogatory or abusive words); the use of irony and sarcasm; and other 
representational devices typical not only for the Cold War discourse, but also for the communist 
propaganda techniques and langue de bois as a whole. For instance, the use of empty signifiers 
connotative of unity, solidarity and comradeship of the Socialist bloc in the Soviet context is 




doomed” (“обреченный”) or “imperialist” (“империалистический”) mobilized in depicting the 
threatening Other. Or, in the post-Soviet context, Izvestiia’s coverage univocally frames the 
events in Ukraine as “our right” to protect Russians, “brothers” or “our people” threatened by 
“them” referring to the Ukrainian “extremists” (“экстремисты”), “nationalists” 
(“националисты), or “fascists” (“фашисты”).  
As Entman (1993) puts it, frames work by emphasizing or repeating particular 
information, or by associating it with signifying elements such as “culturally familiar symbols” 
(p. 53). With regard to political discourse: 
 
Frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, 
which might lead audiences to have different reactions.  Framing in this light plays 
a major role in the exertion of political power, and the frame in a news text is really 
the imprint of power-it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to 
dominate the text. Reflecting the play of power and boundaries of discourse over an 
issue, many news texts exhibit homogenous framing at one level of analysis, yet 
competing frames at another (p. 55).  
 
As the findings of this thesis aim to demonstrate, the Cold War framework, as mobilized 
by Izvestiia, in both Soviet and post-Soviet contexts, operates discursively by the constant 
juxtaposition of the general mythologies of our good things and their bad things or our rightness 
against their madness. These repetitive themes exemplify not only the homogeneity of news 
discourse, but also the power of news framing by reinforcing some aspects of the constructed 




extract the buried meanings from Izvestiia’s texts by examining the selection, exclusion, or 
salience of certain aspects of this reality in Soviet and post-Soviet times. To do so, the qualitative 
approach to frame analysis looks at specific words as “the building blocks of frames” (Entman, 
1993). In the contemporary Russian context, one dominant building block is the tsarist concept 
of New Russia (Novorossiia), which is largely mobilized by Izvestiia as a reference to “the 
historical ruptures of Russian history.”15 Another example of frame construction in support of the 
pro-Russian narrative is the Russian Orthodox tradition, which is consistently mobilized as a 
bridge between Russia and Russian people in Ukraine. In addition, this level of analysis seeks to 
identify how often references to official sources are on display. This involves the use of “expert 
knowledge” to lend credibility to human-interest stories. 
While the linguistic analysis refers to lexical and stylistic features of texts, the second 
part of Fairclough’s framework corresponds to an intertextual analysis (Fairclough 1995, p. 61). 
Intertextual analysis occupies the middle position in Fairclough’s analytical framework “as it 
mediates the connection between language and social context (…) bridging the gap between 
texts and contexts” and drawing attention “to the dependence of texts upon society and history” 
(p. 195). In the terminology of the three-dimensional framework, intertextual analysis refers to 
the dimension of “discourse practice” as it aims “to unravel various genres and discourses (…) 
which are articulated together in the text” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 61).  
As it applies to Izvestiia, intertextuality draws upon “genres of discourses” or “diverse 
representations of social life” and the way they support or interfere with one another (Fairclough, 
2001, p. 2). The different genres of discourse, as discussed by Van Dijk (2001) and Fairclough 
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(1992; 1995) could be better understood as public or private, institutional, professional, medical, 
educational, corporate, or bureaucratic. What Bakhtin (1986/2013) refers to as “speech genres” 
or “relatively stable types of utterances” as in everyday narration, writing, social, political, 
military or scientific speech categories (p. 60).  
For example, in the Soviet context, Izvestiia uses discursive genres that range from 
conversational – usually expressed as rhetorical questions or appeals “to a friend” – to 
militaristic, pathetic, highly opinionated, and speech that is subordinated to the bureaucratic, 
paternalistic and upbringing tone of the Party. Izvestiia’s post-Soviet texts reveal a plurality of 
discursive genres as well, varying from conversational, literary, publicist, ironic and sarcastic to 
experts’ pieces usually written by journalists, philosophers or political scientists, but univocally 
framed in support of the Kremlin’s view. 
John Austin’s classification of speech acts, as discussed by Von Seth (2011), also 
provides a useful theoretical tool to supplement the second level of analysis. According to 
Austin, different speech acts, depending on the illocutionary or semantic force of the verbs in the 
utterance, belong to five categories: “exercitives” which presuppose some unequal relationship 
between speaker and addressee resulting in commands, warnings or declarations; “verdictives” 
which are also seen as expression of power but in more interpretative sense, as analysis, 
diagnoses or judgments; and “commissives” such as promises, intentions and plans that 
presuppose a more equal relationship between speaker and reader. Austin’s last two categories – 
“behabitives” and “expositives” – give the reader the right to comment or to judge (p. 59). For 
instance, in the Soviet context, the symbolic power of the texts is built through assertive and 
directive verbs such as “announce” (“объявляют”), “stress” (подчеркивают), or “require” 




decision. In Von Seth’s (2011) terms, Izvestiia’s texts regarding Czechoslovakia could be 
identified as “expositives” – commands, warnings and declarations – rather than as intentions for 
dialogue.  
The second level of analysis, therefore, seeks to identify what kind of language is 
predominant in Izvestiia’s coverage. Austin’s classification of speech acts is useful in bringing to 
light some rational conclusions about the self-representation of journalists in Soviet and post-
Soviet times, as sympathetic to the audience or the authorities, as peers, educators or 
propagators. To this end, genres of discourse and speech acts reveal how a particular news media 
text is being addressed. Does it inform, entertain, give order or suggest dialogue? What is the 
semantic meaning of the text? Is it to command, assure, state, argue, or predict? Is the audience 
addressed as a collective or as individuals? 
The third level of analysis corresponds to sociocultural practices, or the broader political 
and sociocultural context within which news media discourses operate. As Fairclough puts it, 
this level of analysis involves a “more immediate situational context, the wider context of 
institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the 
culture” (p. 62). In relation to the notion of intertextuality, this level of analysis suggests that the 
meaning of a text does not reside in the text itself, “but is produced by the reader in relation not 
only to the text in question, but also to the complex network of texts invoked in the reading 
process” (Malykhina, 2014, p. 9). Applied to the case studies, this level of analysis aims to 
articulate the broad contours of the context – historical, geographical, and cultural – as mobilized 
by Izvestiia in the newspaper’s references to a mythological past, cultural symbols, or an 
imagined future. The goal of this analytical level, therefore, is to locate Izvestiia’s agency and 




identify how Czechoslovakia and Ukraine are represented in the Russian cultural imagination by 
revealing linguistic strategies in how the Soviet Union/Russia and the Western other are 
addressed, as well as the prevailing themes and the broader context within which the Soviet or 
Russian identity is constituted.  
To this end, Benedict Anderson’s (1983) theoretical notion of the “imagined 
communities” provides significant ground for discussion. According to Anderson’s concept, the 
media play a crucial role as nation-builders by “imagining” some shared idea of common 
belonging through a variety of symbolic practices. This shared idea of common belonging might 
be imagined through the elaboration of shared national feelings based on glorifying the past, 
presenting unifying causes, or constructing a common threat or enemy. The notion of an 
imagined community is especially helpful in understanding what Homo Sovieticus represents in 
1968 (as constructed by Izvestiia), and the implications for the meaning of the Russian Idea in 
2014.   
As illustrated in Oleksii Polegkyi’s (2011) analysis of the concept of the “Russian 
world,” the Russian identity is built on several main pillars. First, is that of difference from the 
West and similarity to the Near Abroad. According to this pillar, Russia aims to counter the 
Westernization ambitions in the Near Abroad by presenting itself as an attractive and preferable 
alternative for the Russian diaspora in the former Soviet republics. The West is often seen, as 
Polegkyi points out, as a mythical “Big Other” for a creation of the Russian identity (p. 16). 
Accordingly, news media play a crucial role in building a certain common sense of belonging by 
positioning the Self against the imagined Other.  
The concept of any imagined “Russian world” or identity refers not only to the Russian 




imagined cornerstones of this Russian culture are: common language, common history and the 
Russian Orthodox Church. The third level of analysis, therefore, seeks to identify the way in 
which the imagined Homo Sovieticus was re-constructed in post-Soviet times and applied to a 
new sense of imagined Russian greatness. 
The overarching tenet of the theoretical framework is that the meaning of social 
phenomena is socially constructed through language. It follows then that Izvestiia, as a pro-
Kremlin news outlet, is not therein a neutral medium that conveys ideas independently. Indeed, 
the method for analysis reveals Izvestiia to be a conduit for “an institutionalized structure of 
meanings that channels political thought and action in certain directions” (Polegkyi, 2011, p. 9). 
This explicitly illustrates what Foucault (1980) refers to as “techniques of power” which do not 
act directly and immediately (p. 125). To paraphrase Foucault, such forms of power act upon 
people’s consciousness and beliefs instead upon their everyday actions. In the context of this 
thesis, Izvestiia is seen as a legitimator of the Kremlin’s agenda through the dissemination of 
particular imagined shared meanings, which, over time and with varying degrees of intensity, act 
upon the larger cultural and political perceptions of the Russian public. The next chapter aims to 










Komrades to the Rescue: The Cases of Czechoslovakia and Ukraine 
 
This chapter outlines the main findings of the analysis of both communist and post-
communist press texts, as they are represented in Izvestiia. Taking a before-and-after approach, 
the two case studies – the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the crisis over Ukraine 
in 2014 – are performed, as well as compared and contrasted. As expected, similarities but also 
variations emerge in the different patterns of Cold War discourse, mobilized by Izvestiia, in two 
historically different periods. The following pages reveal, in detail, what these patterns are and to 
what extent they support or contradict the claims of this thesis.16  
 
Czechoslovakia 
Not surprisingly, the way Izvestiia frames the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 
1968 mirrors the dominant Communist Party line – and its leader Leonid Brezhnev’s views – of 
the Soviet commonwealth, comradeship and solidarity. However, some diversity in terms of 
journalistic style is on display. News announcements, official reports, foreign correspondences, 
interviews, official dispatches, appeals and more opinionated items such as experts’ comments 
are all used to convey the Party line. A certain degree of story variety is also observed in terms of 
official party publications; statements by communist leaders; human stories such as letters “to a 
friend” or workers’ reports; reports on holiday celebrations in the Soviet bloc; or encomiums of 
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productivity achievements in selected factories. Some stories carry a by-line, others are reprinted 
from TASS, the Soviet wire service, or Pravda, the newspaper of the Communist Party.  
Although it appears that there is a plurality of voices, every item of information is framed 
through repetitive terms and empty signifiers, usually delivered in headlines, in a manner that is 
an abstract connotative of unity, solidarity and comradeship: “Unity of People and Party” 
(“Единство народа и партии,” 31.03.1968), “Cohesion of the Forward Marching [countries]” 
(“Сплоченность идущих вперед,” 06.04.1968), “Strengthening of Socialism – Our Common 
Task” (“Укрепление социализма – наша общая задача,” 20.07.1968), “Our Brotherly Alliance 
is Unbreakable” (“Наш братский союз нерушим,” 22.07.1968), “Proletarian Solidarity in 
Action” (“Пролетарская солидарность в действий,” 23.08.1968), “Czechoslovakia – A Strong 
Unit of the Warsaw Pact” (“Чехословакия – прочное звено Варшавского договора,” 
22.06.1968),  “Unity – A Guarantee of Victories” (“Единство – гарантия побед,“ 08.08.1968), 
and “Defense of Socialism – The Highest International Duty” (“Защита социализма – высший 
интернациональный долг,” 23.08.1968). To further strengthen their emotional appeal, the 
headlines and subheadings are bold and much bigger in size than the underlying text.17  
The linguistic symbolic devices for meaning construction regarding not only 
Czechoslovakia but every other socialist country are built through the use of epithets such as 
“mighty” (“могучий”), “progressive” (“прогрессивный”), “socialist” (“социалистический”) 
and “great” (“великий”) – each intended to underscore the superiority of the Socialist bloc. 
These terms work in opposition to pejoratives such as “ill-doomed” (“обреченный”) and 
“criminal” (“преступный”) each mobilized in depicting the United States, Bonn (the former 
capital of West Germany) and NATO. Metaphors such as “mighty guardian of the world” 
                                                          
 




(“могучий страж мира”) referring to the fiftieth “glorious anniversary“ (“славный юбилей”) of 
the Soviet armed forces (25.02.1968), backed by rhetorical signifiers such as  “friendship” 
(“дружба”), “solidarity” (“солидарность”), “brotherhood” (“братство”), “care” (“забота”), 
“unity” (“единство”), “hospitality” (“гостеприимство”),  and “cordiality” (“радушие”) are 
used as another strategy in building the Soviet brotherhood’s mutuality and greatness.  
Discursive genres vary from conversational – usually represented as rhetorical questions 
or appeals “to a friend” – to military, pathetic, highly opinionated and subordinated to the 
bureaucratic, paternalistic and upbringing tone of the Party. As a result, categorical assertions, 
and what Von Seth (2011) refers to as an “objective” or impersonal modality, prevail throughout 
Izvestiia’s texts. This includes the “we” form of expression as a unifying signifier for the 
collectivity of the Socialist bloc (p. 60). However, the use of pronouns like “we” or “us” in 
journalistic texts, in general, is “slippery.” It is often used by journalists or politicians to make 
vague statements, and to evoke their own ideas as our ideas, thus creating a sense of Other that is 
in opposition to these shared ideas (Machin and Mayr, 2012, p. 84). In the case of Izvestiia, the 
vagueness of the unquestioned “we” dressed up as “Soviet communists” (“советские 
коммунисты”), “the entire Soviet people” (“весь советский народ”) or the whole “socialist 
commonwealth” (“социалистическое содружие”) suggests one dominant view – that of the 
Kremlin – hidden under the veil of common values and beliefs. In this light, the readers are not 
addressed as individuals with different ideas or opinions. Rather, they represent workers, 
impersonalized friends or comrades, or a generalized projection of the Soviet or Czech people.  
The symbolic power of the texts is built through nominalisations, such as “resistance to 
the intrigues,” “a threat to socialism,” “fighting against” that conceal the real actors – namely 




goals of the actions. Thus, by removing people or the real agents of the story, the responsibility 
for a particular position is also removed. Applied in journalistic texts, as Machin and Mayr 
(2012) observe, the nominalisation technique represents a linguistic strategy of concealment and 
makes the position or action of the speaker/writer seem as it has just happen (p. 138). In the 
context of 1968, the real action – the invasion – is discursively built as necessary self-protection 
against an imaginary threat. Another important effect of such lack of specification, hidden under 
pompous, but empty slogans, is that it conceals not only questions of agency but promotes a very 
particular point of view: that of the Communist Party.  
Another technique in support of the Party line is built through assertive and directive 
verbs such as “declare” (“заявляют”), “approve” (“одобряют”), “announce” (“объявляют”), 
“stress” (“подчеркивают”), “require” (“требуют”), “confirm” (“потверждают”), all used to 
frame the dominant view as the only unquestioned truth or possible decision. In Von Seth’s 
(2011) terms, Izvestiia’s texts regarding Czechoslovakia could be identified as “expositives” – 
commands, warnings and declarations – rather than as intentions for dialogue, which might lead 
to differing opinions or possible unwanted interpretations. For example, on the day following the 
invasion, August 22, the headline “In the Name of Security of Fraternal People” (“Во имя 
безопасности братских народов”) was followed by the categorical assertion expressed in the 
subheading “No One Will Ever Be Allowed to Wrest Even One Unit from the Commonwealth of 
the Socialist Countries” (“Никому и никогда не будет позволено вырвать ни одного звена из 
содружества социалистических государств”). This was published on Izvestiia’s front page, 
along with smaller headlines spread across the front page reading “Working Solidarity” 
(Рабочая солидарность), “A Necessary Step” (“Нужный шаг”), and “A Holy Duty” (“Святой 




invitation to discuss or interpret meanings. Journalists, following the Party line, clearly 
positioned themselves as propagators or educators on behalf of the communist leadership, rather 
than peers to the depersonalized readers addressed as “workers” or “people.”  
However, to discursively construct an illusion of participatory inclusion with its readers, 
or in Bakhtinian terms, to accumulate senses through particular utterances or speech acts, 
Izvestiia relied not only on common values but on emotionally charged utterances, often 
expressed through concerns and appeals. Such utterances were constructed through what Machin 
and Mayr (2012) call “affection,” usually verbs that indicate liking, disliking, or fear that 
encourage readers to emote empathy, worry, or anxiety through the provided information. An 
example of perpetual fear-construction can be traced in “A Declaration About the Threat to the 
World Created as a Result of the Expansion of the American Aggression in Vietnam” 
(“Декларация об угрозе миру, создавшейся в результате расширения американской 
агрессии во Вьетнам”), published on March 10. The sense of anxiety was constructed through 
verbal expressions such as “expand the war” (“расширяют войны”), “threat to use nuclear 
weapons” (“угрожают применить ядерное оружие”), “bombard the capital” (“бомбардируют 
столицу”), and “break the resistance” (“сломить сопротивление”). In contrast, the sense of 
liking and empathy was conveyed through expressions such as “committed to our comradeship” 
(“посвещенные нашей дружбе”), “our bosom relations have strengthened and tempered” 
(“наши сердечные отношения окрепли и закалились”), and “no one will succeed in breaking 
the monolithic union between the Czech Socialist Republic, the USSR and the rest of the 
socialist countries” (“никому не удастся нарушить монолитный союз ЧССР с Советским 
Cоюзом и другими социалистическими странами”). It is evident that Izvestiia’s discourse 




other. These kinds of discursive strategies almost always work in tandem and are very effective 
because of it. 
Often, the texts were also communicated through “experts” identified through particular 
specialties; for example, generals or professors. Such use of “functional honorifics” signifies the 
importance of the person, their seniority, and the ensuing degree of respect (Machin and Mayr 
2012, p. 82). Throughout the experts’ texts the “I-form” or subjective modality is used to 
emphasize the importance and authority of the actor, and to support and assert the moral integrity 
of the dominant view. The presumption is that “specialists” have specialized knowledge, so they 
are expected to serve as role models and trustworthy instructors; i.e., they have credibility 
because of their expert status. In a statement entitled “A Feat” (“Подвиг”) for example, 
published on May 9, the author, Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Zakharov, was enlisted to boost 
socialist pride, by providing specific numbers and statistics through an historical reference to the 
Great Patriotic War. His contribution compared Soviet glory to the “myth of the unconquerable 
Hitler army” (“миф о непобедимости гитлеровской армии“).18 With regard to Czechoslovakia 
and the Socialist bloc, such an historical reference, provided by an “expert” can be regarded as a 
demonstration of the unquestioned superiority of the Soviet army over the imagined threatening 
factor.  
This role-model semantic was reinforced by vague elevated-sounding presuppositions – 
or in Fairclough’s (1995) terms “pre-constructed elements” – such as “Socialist bloc,” 
“Marxism-Leninism,” “proletarian internationalism,” “imperialism” or “bourgeois ideology.” 
Such taken for granted monolithic concepts assume that every reader (presumably worker) 
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should know what they indicate. The exact meaning of these pre-constructed elements is not 
articulated; however, repeated constantly, they serve to advance the dominant interests and 
ideologies. Moreover, such monolithic concepts tap into war- and post-war propaganda used to 
convince Russians of their superiority, and the superiority of their system, in defeating the Nazi 
invasion in the Second World War. 
It is also worth noting that at the beginning of 1968 news about Czechoslovakia usually 
came along with dispatches from Sofia, Warsaw, and other socialist capitals, informing of 
“friendly and sincere” (“дружеские и искренние”) visits, military partnership talks or 
“productive cooperation” (“плодотворное сотрудничество”) built on “the great principles of 
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism” (“на основе великих принципов 
марксизма-ленинизма,” 26.06.1968). Most of the articles examined from January to June are 
highly empathetic and emotive. They are also strikingly forceful in their attempts to create a 
positive image of Soviet glory and greatness, both past and present. Holidays, such as the “Soviet 
Victory over Nazi-German Fascism” celebrated on May 9; the 98th anniversary of Lenin’s birth 
celebrated on April 22; the 150th anniversary of Karl Marx’s birth celebrated on May 5; the 50th 
anniversary of the Red Army; or May 1 – International Workers’ Day – all served as a bolstering 
ideological tool. The objective was first, to bring to light the ideals of Marxism-Leninism and 
second, to create a sense of one family: that of “the little man” within the Socialist bloc, as 
opposed to the “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie” (“диктатура буржуазии”), “the enemy 
imperialist ideology” (“вражеской империалистической идеологии”) or “the American 
aggression” (“американской агрессии”).  
However, as the tension in Prague rose throughout the year, the usual TASS “friendly” 




Committee of the Czech Communist Party or to “the Czech people,” accompanied by short 
letters written by “Soviet people” or “workers.” Usually, these letters sympathized with “the 
anxiety” (тревога) of the communist leadership regarding the events in Czechoslovakia “where a 
situation occurred when the interests of socialism are put in jeopardy” (“где возникла ситуация, 
когда подвергаются опасности интересы социализма,” 20.07.1968). In these letters, the 
opening salutation “Dear comrades” differs significantly from its earlier discursive usages 




On behalf of the Central Committees of the Communist and workers’ parties of 
Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union, we appeal to you with this 
letter, governed by sincere friendship, built on the principles of Marxism-Leninism 
and proletarian internationalism, to express our concern about the state of our 
common affairs, about the strengthening of the positions of socialism and security, 
about the Socialist community of peoples (18.07.1968).19  
 
The sense of anxiety and the need to resist it is also communicated as a collective “holy” 
or “common” duty, projected through rhetorical devices such as “we” (“мы”) “our” (“наши”), 
                                                          
 
19 Дорогие товарищи! От имени Центральных Комитетов коммунистических и рабочих партий Болгарии, 
Венгрии, ГДР, Польши и Советского Союза обращаемся к вам с этим письмом, продиктованным искренней 
дружбой, основанной на принципах марксизма-ленинизма и пролетарского интернационализма, заботой о 
наших общих делах, об укреплении позиций социализма и безопасности, социалистического содружества 
народов; Центральному комитету комунистической партии Чехословакии [Appeal to the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia]. (1968, July 18). Izvestiia. Retrieved from McGill University Microfilm 




“loyalty” (“верность”), “brotherhood” (“братство”), “high goal” (“высокая цель”), “unity – 
guarantee for victory” (“единство – гарантия побед,” 08.08.1968), and “solidarity, friendship” 
(“солидарность, дружба,” 09.08.1968). However, if the “Soviet people’s” appeals and 
approvals usually represented small pieces of texts, the official Kremlin’s positions 
communicated as the view of “our parties, our people” (“наши партии, наши народы”) were 
granted much wider editorial space. Such is the case in a two-page article in Pravda reprinted by 
Izvestiia under the headline “The Defense of Socialism – The Highest International Duty” 
(“Защита социализма – высший интернациональный долг”) published two days after the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, on August 23.20  
Throughout the months of July and August the tone would become both more alarming 
and instructive. However, the word “invasion” (“вторжение”) was never used. Rather, the 
Kremlin’s intentions were reported by Izvestiia as a “fight against bourgeois ideology, against all 
anti-socialist forces” (“борьба против буржуазной идеологии, против всех 
антисоциалистических сил”) as pointed out in a statement on behalf of the Communist and 
Working parties of the Socialist countries, published on August 4, after the Soviet-Czechoslovak 
Čierna nad Tisou and Bratislava talks in late July and August.21  
Overall, the length of the stories increased significantly in August 1968 compared to the 
rest of the year, a fact that corresponds to the Kremlin’s eventual decision to move 165,000 
soldiers and 4,600 tanks into Czechoslovakia under the code name Operation Danube during the 
night of August 20-21 (Williams, 1997, p. 112). Until that point there are no linguistic signifiers 
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21 Čierna nad Tisou is a Slovak village on the border with Ukraine. The Čierna and Bratislava meetings followed 
several other Soviet-Czechoslovak talks aimed to “to help break the impasse” with Czechoslovak liberal reformers. 




within Izvestiia’s texts indicating an erosion of Soviet trust. This could be viewed as part of the 
ideological work of the press to praise the imagined glorious Soviet brotherhood, in support of 
the imposed regime of truth, and to contrast it to “Washington,” “Bonn‘s hypocrites” 
(“Боннские лицемеры”) or “the aggressive NATO bloc” (“агрессивный блок НАТО”) while 
concealing the real issues of the day (20.08.1968).  
As the date of the invasion approached, Izvestiia’s articles suggested increasing panic and 
anxiety. Events in Prague were increasingly denounced as “counter-revolutionary” while the 
overall situation in Czechoslovakia was characterized as “absolutely unacceptable for a socialist 
country” (“абсолютно неприемлива для социалистической страны,” 20.07.1968), and even 
“insane” (“безумнaя,” 31.07.1968). As for the Prague Spring’s manifesto “2000 Words” 
(circulated by pro-reform adherents), it was condemned as a “political platform that contains an 
open appeal for strikes and riots” (“политическая платформа кoторая содержит открытый 
призыв к забастовкам и беспорядкам”), supporting the bourgeois ideologists who “attempt to 
export secretly anti-communism, nationalism and individualism into the world of socialism” 
(“идеологи буржуазии тайно стараются экспортировать в мир социализма антикоммунизм, 
национализм, индивидуализм,” 20.07.1968)  
On August 21, the Kremlin’s decision to invade appeared in Izvestiia as a small TASS 
report.22 It was portrayed as a common decision made by the Soviet Union and its allies to enter 
Czech territory in response to a “request” from Czech Party and Government officials for “urgent 
assistance” including the deployment of military forces, to protect the “Czech fraternal people” 
from “counter-revolutionary forces [that have] entered into [a] plot with hostile to socialism 
                                                          
 




external forces.”23 After the invasion, the frame of “conspiracy,” “plot” (“сговор”), and 
“counter-revolution” (контрреволюция) appeared throughout Izvestiia’s texts, as a counter-
point to the positive descriptive language applied to “the healthy forces” (здоровых сил) оf the 
socialist commonwealth.24 Further justification for the invasion can be found on August 22, 
when the decision to invade was legitimized under the headline “In the Name of Security of 
Fraternal Peoples” (“Во имя безопасности братских народов”).  
Overall, the word “invasion” is absent from the way Izvestiia frames the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Rather, the Kremlin’s decision to send tanks into Prague is portrayed as 
a protectionist act against “counter-revolutionary” forces. By not mentioning “invasion,” the 
Kremlin’s intentions, as reflected in Izvestiia, can be viewed as creating a space where the 
newspaper can insert language more in keeping with its own strategy. Doing so permits the 
Kremlin to allay panic by appealing to emotions that guide readers to support the invasion as a 
necessary act intended to protect a common good. This is based on well-tested Soviet 
propaganda devices, such as emotional outbursts (“Unity of hearts”), catchphrases and slogans 
(“Workers of the world, unite!”), and presuppositions (“progress of humanity”). 
As for the rhetorical strategies deployed, the analysis reveals an abundance of metaphors 
and epithets. In depicting the Socialist bloc, for example, salience was given to specific, in 
Entman’s (1993) words, linguistic “building blocks,” such as guardian, strength, glory, might, 
unity, brotherhood, fraternity, cordiality, and friendship, as well as epithets such as glorious, 
                                                          
 
23 ТАСС уполномочен заявить, что партийные и государственные деятели Чехословацкой Социалистической 
Республики обратились к Советскому Союзу и другим союзным государствам с просьбой об оказании 
братскому чехословацкому народу неотложной помощи, включая помощь вооруженными силами. Это 
обращение вызвано угрозы, которая возникла существующему в Чехословакии социалистическому строю 
(...) со стороны контрреволюционных сил, вступивших в сговор с враждебными социализму внешними 
силами; Заявление ТАСС [TASS Report]. (1968, August 21). Izvestiia. Retrieved from McGill University 
Microfilm Archive. Copy in possession of author. 




victorious, unbreakable, unconquerable, mutual, sincere, friendly, cordial, progressive, forward 
marching, immortal, memorable, defensive, protective, heroic, working, anti-fascist, rational and 
healthy. In contrast, the Other, in a broad sense, is addressed as an enemy: anti-socialist, 
imperialist, fascist, American, Nazi, crafty, capitalist, revenge-seeking, threatening, aggressive, 
bourgeois, provocative, diversionist, ill-doomed, hypocrite, insane.   
In terms of sociocultural practice or the broader context within which the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was framed, the intertextual analysis drawing attention, in Fairclough’s (1995) 
terms, to the dependence of texts upon society and history, uncovers three important frames 
legitimating the Kremlin’s position to invade and supporting the idea that Czechoslovakia and 
other Warsaw Pact countries shared an imagined common Soviet/Socialist identity.  
Threat to the brotherhood and duty to the comrades. This frame is predominant in the 
news coverage, especially before and after the invasion. To legitimate the Kremlin’s decision to 
invade and to build a shared sense of why it was necessary, Izvestiia relied on paternalistic and 
an emotionally rich tone connecting readers directly to notions of a common history, gratitude, 
and shared values. Priority was given to the socialist fraternal comradeship and the duty to guard 
it from threats posed by enemies of the Soviet Union.   
In the appeal to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia from 
July 18, for example, the friendly salutation “Dear comrades” was followed by “deep anxiety” 
(“глубокое беспокойство”) regarding “the offensive of the reactions patronized by imperialism 
against your party and the foundations of the social order in Czechoslovakia” 
(“Поддерживаемое империализмом наступление реакции против вашей партии и основ 
общественного строя ЧССР”).  Further, on August 23, under the headline “The Defense of 




интернациональный долг”) the communist leadership expressed the alarm that the offensive 
“threatens the interests of the whole socialist system” (“подвергает угрозе интересы всей 
социалистической системы”). The symbolic power of the message was reinforced by 
accentuating not only the perception of a threat, but the threat to the sense of unity and common 
belonging supposedly embedded in the common history of Soviets and Czechs. By drawing on 
emotional appeals, the Soviets were often constructed as saviors of the Czechs from Hitler’s 
fascism, suggesting not only common belonging but also gratitude and fraternal duty: 
 
Our parties, our people, were fighting hand in hand (…) against Hitler’s invaders 
(…) And on the territory of Czechoslovakia, the graves of more than one hundred 
thousand Soviet fighters are scattered.  Together with heroic Czechoslovak patriots, 
these people fought for the liberation of Czechoslovakia from Hitler’s fascism. 
Exactly then, in these harsh years, were laid the solid foundations of unity and 
brotherhood between our peoples (23.08.1968).25  
 
Furthermore, the same text expressed the idea that Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and the 
Warsaw Pact were protectors of independence, peace and security in the whole of Europe, and 
that the alliance acted as a “barrier” against “the forces of imperialism, aggression and revenge.”  
                                                          
 
25 Наши партии, наши народы рука об руку боролись (...) против гитлеровских захватчиков (...) И на 
территории Чехословакии разбросаны могилы более ста тысяч советских воинов. Вместе с героическими 
чехословацкими патриотами (…) сражались эти люди за освобождение Чехословакии от гитлеровского 
фашизма. Именно тогда, в эти суровые годы, были заложены крепкие основы единства и братства наших 
народов; Защита социализма – высший интернациональный долг [The Defense of Socialism – The Highest 
International Duty]. (1968, August 23).  Izvestiia. Retrieved from McGill University Microfilm Archive. Copy in 




To strengthen the semantic force of the message, the Soviet idea was repeatedly 
connected to what Siebert et al. (1956) define as “Prometheanism.” In this light, the whole idea 
of the socialist commonwealth reflected universal laws of self-sacrifice in the name of the 
common welfare, and “laws” that were incomprehensible to the “enemy.” Under the headline 
“Will of the Time” (“Веление времени”), published on August 6, the socialist community was 
depicted by Izvestiia as not simply a temporary military and political bloc “like the bourgeois 
propagandists would like to represent it;” rather, the Soviet bloc was represented as 
“qualitatively new step in the gradual progress of humanity.”26  
Conspiracy and counterrevolution is another explicit frame in Izvestiia’s news coverage. 
This frame, in particular, was mobilized to trivialize the ideological drivers of reform that 
surfaced in the Prague Spring such as the “2000 Words” manifesto, “Club-231” and, generally, 
the uncensored free media. In this light, the conspiracy frame – notably reflected in the phrase 
“patronized by imperialism” (“поддерживаемые империализмом“) – illustrates the fear of the 
Soviet leadership of exposing views and ideologies different from, in Siebert et al.’s (1956) 
words, the “Right Line” (p. 144). Hence, all the attempts for liberalization were depicted as 
counter-revolutionary instruments and platforms for “anti-socialist demagogy” 
(“антисоциалистическя демагогия”), which was meant to spread anarchy “under the slogan of 
democratization” (“злоупотребляя лозунгом демократизации, 18.07.1968). In order to 
illustrate to readers the implicit truth in such claims, “American imperialism” was placed in a 
                                                          
 
26 Социалистическое содружество – это не временная групировка, не военно-политический блок, как хотели 
бы представить дело буржуазные пропагандисты. Это качественно новая ступень в поступательном 
развитии человечества; Веление времени [Will of the Time]. (1968, August 6].  Izvestiia. Retrieved from McGill 




broader context of its “criminal war in Vietnam” and its “support of the Israeli aggressors in the 
Middle East” (18.07.1968).  
After the invasion, a normalization frame became predominant. This directly followed 
the Czech-Soviet negotiations held on August 23-26 in Moscow, where a mutual agreement was 
reached “to take actions for urgent normalization of the situation in CSR“ (“была достигнута 
договоренность о мероприятиях, целью которых является скорейшая нормализация 
положения в ЧССР,” 28.08.1968). The normalization frame appeared in short but regular TASS 
dispatches entitled “Concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia” (“К положению в 
Чехословакии”). Each of these dispatches reported on the steps undertaken by the Czech 
government for “normalization of the political and economic life.”27 In Russian, however, as 
Williams (1997) observes, the term normalization has dual meaning: “the process of ‘making 
normal’; and the adaptation of an object to conform to a norm” (p. 39). 
Bearing this in mind, the process of normalization in its Soviet sense should be 
understood as “the re-establishment of rigid centralized control over Czechoslovak society by a 
disciplined, pro-Soviet party” (Williams, 1997, p. 40). Within the Czech communist context, the 
normalized life, as described by Czech President Ludvik Svoboda in his 1970 New Year’s 
address, meant three things: “a better tomorrow;” the confirmation of the leading role of the 
Party; and a “hermetic alliance with the Soviet Union” (p. 40). Thus, the much softer tone in 
Izvestiia’s coverage following the invasion used claims concerning the “healthy process” of 
normalization as a means to soften the Kremlin’s real objective: to reassert the dominant regime 
of truth. Moreover, even the normalization frame was placed in opposition to incendiary 
language that continued to demonize the enemy Other as “agents of imperialists” (“агенты 
                                                          
 




империалистов”) and “provocateurs” (“провокаторы”) disguised as “Western journalists” who 
were trying to impede the process of normalization by disseminating flyers, “fresh European 
information” (“свежaя европейскaя информация”) or “intrigues and disinformation” 
(“интриги и дезинформация”).28  
To further strengthen emotional appeal, the normalization processes led by the Soviet 
government “to protect socialism in Czechoslovakia” were characterized as having 
overwhelming support among both the Czech and Soviet peoples. This was contrasted with a 
supposed minority of “anti-people forces trying to tear Czechoslovakia away from the Socialist 
commonwealth … to cause nationalistic hysteria, anarchy and disorder” (“антинародные силы, 
которые делали ставку на отрыв Чехословакии от социалистического содружества (...) 
стремятся возбуждать настроения националистической истерии, насаждать анархию и 
беспорядок,” 29.08.1968). In an emotionally charged letter entitled “To My Friend in 
Czechoslovakia” (“Моему другу в Чехословакии“), published on August 29, the author 
Georgii Markov addresses his anonymous friend as “my dear friend” (мой дорогой друг) 
expressing the “Soviet people’s concerns” regarding the situation in Czechoslovakia:  
 
We want а better, worthwhile, more beautiful life. Do not you want the same? But 
why, suddenly, did our comradeship, bonded by the blood shed together in fighting 
against a common enemy, become an obstacle to this normal striving for a better 
life? (…) I write these lines and vividly imagine the strenuous life of our 
                                                          
 
28 Провокаторы под маской западных журналистов [Provocateurs Disguised as Western Journalists]. (1968, 




extraordinary soldiers who, today, are fulfilling in your country the international 
duty of the Soviet citizen (29.08.1968).29 
 
Overall, the Cold War is not explicitly mentioned in the sample items about 
Czechoslovakia. However, it dictates and implicitly articulates the way the information is 
conveyed. In other words, the Cold War context constantly positions the on-going events 
between the binary opposition of Us versus Them. In order to strengthen the sense of Us and to 
justify the rightness of the Kremlin’s regime of truth, Izvestiia relies on emotionally charged 
patterns, endlessly invoked, and grounded in easily understood commonalities that resonate 
across emotive categories such as common history, duty, gratitude and shared socialist values. 
Again and again these invocations are juxtaposed with the threat of the Other who aims to break 
the idyll of the Soviet bloc. In this respect, Moscow’s decision to invade Czechoslovakia is 
portrayed as not only moral task to protect the Self and the imagined Homo Sovieticus, but also 
as the only rational response, one that aims to “put things right.”  
 
Ukraine 
In the context of Ukraine, Izvestiia’s coverage contains predominantly (if not only) 
emotionally charged and highly empathetic items corresponding, in terms of journalistic practice, 
to opinion pieces – editorials or interviews – rather than to factual news. In this sense, a greater 
diversity of style genres was mobilized in the coverage of Czechoslovakia in the 1968 example. 
                                                          
 
29 Мы хотим жить лучше, содержательнее, красивее. Разве вы сами не хотите этого? Ну почему этому 
нормальному стремлению вашего народа вдруг стала мешать наша дружба, скрепленная совместно 
пролитой кровью в боях с общим врагом? (...) Я пишу эти строки и живо представляю напряженную жизнь 
наших замечательных армейских парней, выполняющих сегодня в вашей стране интернациональный долг 
советского гражданина; Моему другу в Чехословакии [To My Friend in Czechoslovakia]. (1968, August 29). 




Considering that Ukraine is still regarded by most Russians as part of the Russian/post-Soviet 
sphere of influence, usually referred to as the Near Abroad, such an appeal to emotion should not 
be surprising. Russians overwhelmingly think of Crimea as their territory, inextricably connected 
historically, culturally and linguistically to them.30 Russian-speaking Crimeans also tend to think 
of themselves as historically belonging to Russia. Such cross-associations are reified in 
expressions of Russian power: Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, for example, is based on the Crimean 
peninsula. Russian ethnicity and language, and resonances with the perceived glories of the 
Soviet past are, therefore, deeply embedded.  
Prior to the Sochi Olympics (February 7 to February 23, 2014), Izvestiia’s interest in 
Ukraine is quite intense, often with more than five opinion pieces per online issue dedicated, 
explicitly or implicitly, to praising, condemning, educating or propagating the need to remember 
or to protect ethnic Russians in Crimea, the Russian past, or Russian culture. The tone of these 
opinion pieces is highly emotional with an educational undertone. For example, the newspaper’s 
overarching narrative choices constantly highlight the need to revitalize the Soviet Union’s 
glorious past, which is seen as “doomed to oblivion” unless Russians stick together. By 
contrasting athletic achievements, “loud victories,” “great champions and athletes,” such as Lev 
Yashin (a football goalkeeper) depicted as “heroes” with today’s “long-legged, busty” 
supermodel Irina Shayk, the newspaper repeatedly underscores a desire to keep memory alive 
and both preserve and promote an ideal of common legacy through the evocation of former 
Soviet sporting successes (09.01.2014).31  
                                                          
 
30 See, for example, the movie “Crimea: The Way Back Home” premiered on YouTube in March 2015. 
31 Shakhnazarov, M. (2014, January 9). Пусть помнят твердо героев спорта [Let’s Firmly Remember Sports’ 




Some of Izvestiia’s opinion pieces are reminiscent of a history lesson. Such is the case 
with “Common Duty,” submitted by Maksim Kantor – a writer and painter – and published on 
January 9. Kantor begins his reflections with the bombing of Dresden in 1945, using the 
historical reference to build arguments in support of the Russian “national idea.” He goes on to 
cite reminders of the “glorious Russian past” by invoking literary luminaries: the Apostle Paul, 
Dostoevsky, Fyodorov and Mayakovsky. Contemporary Russia is depicted as a “unique societal 
entity” threatened by “ideological crisis” whose “Christian duty” is to stay together in order to 
survive. The obvious message in Kantor’s appeal is the need for self-protection from an 
impersonalised threat, a need that extends to protection of the neighbour.32  
The escalation of territorial tensions in Ukraine throughout the following months is used 
as yet another reason for propagating Russianness in the pages of Izvestiia. In this regard, 
Vladimir Putin was able to play the Crimean card as kind of readymade “ace,” for constructing 
the case that Crimea was, and remains, an integral part of Russia, a part that was relinquished as 
a result of an historical injustice. Starting with the protests on Kyiv’s Independence Square 
(Maidan Nezalezhnosti), the consequent annexation of Crimea in March, in spite of Western 
sanctions and outrage, Izvestiia’s coverage frames the events as “our right” to protect Russians, 
“brothers” or “our people” threatened by “them” referring to the Ukrainian “extremists,” 
                                                          
 
32 В России, которую жадность рвет в лоскуты, которую душат мелкие амбиции ничтожеств, которая 
судорожно ищет национальную идею, способную сплотить, данная идея существует давно. В разные 
времена эту идею выражали разными словами люди разных идеологических взглядов: и апостол Павел, и 
Достоевский, и Маяковский (...) долг христианина существует вопреки соревнованию, только 
солидарностью создается общество; Kantor, M. (2014, January 9). Общее дело [Common Duty]. Izvestiia, p. 9. 




“nationalists” or “fascists” backed by “liberal gentlemen,” “ultraliberal Western Europe” or 
“gloomy Washington.”33  
To foment a sense of panic and to legitimize the need to act, the events in Ukraine are 
depicted as “anarchy,” “outrages,” “radicalized,” “bloody,” and “aggressive.” Europe is 
repeatedly portrayed in oppositional terms as “Western,” “Russophobe,” “supporting gay 
marriages,” and “the Other Europe” (referring to Russia) – the defender of discredited 
conservative Christian values. In the same context, Putin is portrayed as “the most valued 
European in Europe” (“самый ценимый европеец в Европе”).34 Placed within a “civilizational 
framework” which reappears repeatedly, Ukraine is also characterized as “one country, two 
civilizations,” an allusion to East Ukraine as pro-Russian; and “Kyiv-Westernish” seen as pro-
Western, but invaded by “aliens,” “provocateurs,” “nationalists,” and “neo-Nazis” 
(22.01.2014).35  
Within the same civilizational framework, the depiction of the events in Ukraine 
escalates throughout the examined period to become a “civilizational skirmish” 
(“цивилизационнaя схваткa”) of the Third Rome (alluding to Moscow as the successor to the 
legacy of ancient Rome and Constantinople) versus “Hitler with a tail” or “Judas,” a reference to 
Dmytro Yarosh, the leader of the Ukrainian ultra-nationalist group, Right Sector (24.01.2014).36 
                                                          
 
33 As an example, see Benediktov, K. (2014, January 13). Россия и Германия - сотрудничество без 
дипломатических отговорок [Russia and Germany – Cooperation without Diplomatic Excuses]. Izvestiia, p. 6. 
Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38269335; and Kononenko, M. (2014, February 28). 
Валькирии и музы [Valkyries and Muses]. Izvestiia, p. 9. Retrieved from 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38974975.    
34 Mezhuev, B. (2014, January 16). На нас смотрит вся Европа [All of Europe is Watching Us]. Izvestiia, p. 6. 
Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38286896.  
35 Bondarenko, O. (2014, January 22). Виктор Федорович, раздавите гадину [Viktor Fedorovich, Crush the 
Reptile]. Izvestiia, p. 6. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38324039.    
36 Karaulov, I. (2014, January 24). Гитлер с хвостом, Вий с усиками [Hitler with a tail. Vii with a small 




Within Ukraine, the same civilizational conflict is depicted as the “Slavonic anti-fascist front in 
Crimea” versus “Euromaidan” (Euro Square), referring to the Independence Square in Kyiv 
where the unrest in Ukraine began.  
To further legitimize the Russian military intervention in Ukraine as protection not only 
of Russian “blood brothers,” but also as a self-protection, a different rhetorical strategy was 
mobilized prior to the Crimean referendum held in March. In this case, Izvestiia represents 
events within the framework of panic and anxiety for “the Russian-speaking population” and 
“common national relics” (29.01.2014).37 The threat of a referendum rejection of Russia is 
represented as “counterrevolution” and a “coup d’état.” Anxiety was gradually stoked through 
the use of pejoratives and metaphors representing the authorities in Kyiv as an “Atlantic liberal-
Nazi junta” or “useful idiots for liberal gentlemen,” and part of “the global web of the American 
hegemony” (28.02.2014).38  
In turn, Russia’s legitimacy to act with regard to Crimea is presented as the only rational 
choice that Putin could make to protect the “pro-Russian citizens of Crimea.” To strengthen the 
symbolic power of the message, Izvestiia contrasts Kyiv’s foolishness to the hopelessness of the 
“worried citizens of Crimea” who “can only pray” for someone to come to their aid 
(21.01.2014).39 Moreover, the power of the message continually relies on the presupposition of 
Crimean Russianness by articulating a statistical claim concerning the “millions of Crimean- 
Russians” who have a natural claim to protection from the Kremlin.  
                                                          
 
37 Levental’, V. (2014, January 29). Сегодня мы все ленинградцы [Today We are All Leningraders]. Izvestiia, p. 6. 
Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38390542.  
38 Migranian, A. (2014, February 28). Украинская головоломка [Ukrainian Conundrum]. Izvestiia online. 
Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/566745.  
39 Matsarskii, I. & Shakirov, D. (2014, January 21). Нам не нужна кровь, нам даже не нужна власть [We Don’t 





As Machin and Mayr (2012) observe, such statistics can be used to give the impression of 
credibility, when, in fact, readers are not given any specific information (p. 30).  However in the 
case of Crimea, such “number games” could be seen as a strong tactic to gain public support. 
This is overtly expressed in an Izvestiia article from February 28, which explicitly stresses that 
“the biggest part of the [Crimean] peninsula’s population traditionally gravitates to Russia which 
is not surprising considering its Russianness” (Основная масса населения полуострова 
традиционно тяготеет к России, что и неудивительно, учитывая ее русскость).40 The sense 
of unity, entity and common belonging is also reasserted through emotional clues, usually 
conveyed in the headlines. These include the phrases: “Unity of hearts” (“Eдинение сердец,“ 
16.03.2014), “We won’t leave our people” (“Своих не бросим,” 19.03.2014), and “Motherland, 
we are back” (“Родина, мы вернулись,” 19.03.2014), all of which resonate with the old Soviet 
abstract way of constructing symbolic meaning.  
The decision to send troops into Ukraine at the end of February is represented in elevated, 
paternalistic, and emotionally charged assertions. A Manichean “either …either” choice, or the 
use of an aggressive and dictatorial “must” form is used to make it clear to readers that the 
“wrong” choice will lead to an irreversible mistake. For example, in an article entitled “[Russia] 
Must Not Throw Russian People Away,” Izvestiia’s special correspondent Elizaveta Maetnaia 
reports from Simferopol (the administrative centre of Crimea):  
 
I have a bunch of friends in Moscow, they are calling every day and I am asking – 
well, what have Yours [your government] decided – when are they going to help 
                                                          
 





us? Yes, including with the army, you must not abandon Russian people here (…) 
Russia not only has to, Russia must help us; there are more than 70% of Russian-
speakers here (…) Russia, we are with you! Putin is our President! (27.02.2014).41 
   
Within the same issue from February 27, the head of the City Council in Simferopol depicts the 
Crimean people as scared, “beaten by radicals,” mobilizing and arming themselves in order to 
say “no” to what is happening. In response to reports of “extreme danger” and “urgent requests 
for help,” the Kremlin’s decision to send troops is expressed through the categorical assertion: 
“We won’t leave our brothers and more than one million compatriots” (27.02.2014). As with the 
Soviet-Czechoslovakian intervention (a half-century previously), the word “invasion” is never 
mentioned. Rather, the Kremlin’s actions are represented as the only rational decision, even 
“against its will:”  
 
Russia does not need irredentism. Imperialistic seizures won’t make it [Russia] 
stronger, richer, or more moral. We have enough land. There are uncultivated lands 
in the East, there are many desolated villages in the center of the country. As for the 
Russians abroad – the task and duty of Russia is to protect their rights worldwide. 
(…) Russia is not occupying and is not annexing (…) the course of the events has 
                                                          
 
41 У меня куча друзей в Москве, звонят каждый день, а я у них спрашиваю - ну что там 
ваши решили, когда помогать будут? Да, в том числе и войсками, нельзя русских людей тут бросать (…) 
Россия должна, нет - обязана нам помочь, у нас тут больше 70% русскоязычных (…) Россия, мы с тобой! 
Путин наш президент; Maetnaia, E. (2014, February 27). Нельзя русских людей тут бросать [[Russia] Must Not 




placed Russia, against its will, in a position of the only guarantor of the sovereignty 
of a neighbouring country (03.03.2014).42  
 
Within the same issue, Russia’s readiness to settle the conflict in Ukraine, including with 
military forces, is portrayed as “an invitation to dialogue” rather than as confrontation: 
 
What remains for Russia to do in this situation? Only to take a hard line, inviting 
partners to serious dialogue (…) Presumably, Russia’s demonstrated readiness to 
regularize the Ukrainian crisis, including with military force, does not represent a 
step on the path towards confrontation, rather it is an invitation to a dialogue 
(03.03.2014).43 
 
Surprisingly or not, as in Soviet times, the Kremlin’s position is justified as not only the only 
rational choice to protect the Self but also as a needed step to protect “world history.” This 
sentiment is summed up in the quotation: “In the face of Kyiv’s junta, Putin decides not only the 
                                                          
 
42 Россия не нуждается в ирреденте. Империалистические захваты не сделают ее ни сильнее, ни богаче, ни 
нравственнее. У нас земли хватает. Есть неосвоенные просторы на востоке, есть множество пустующих 
деревень в центре страны. Что же до русских за рубежом, то задача и долг России - защищать их права во 
всех странах (…) Россия не оккупирует и не аннексирует (…) ход событий поставил Россию против ее воли 
в положение единственного гаранта суверенитета соседней страны; Karaulov, I. (2014, March 3).  Когда 
срывают компромисс [When [They] Raze Compromise]. Izvestiia, p. 9. Retrieved from 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38984485.  
43 Что остается делать России в этой ситуации? Только проводить жесткую линию, приглашая 
партнеров к серьезному диалогу (…) Можно предположить, что продемонстрированная Россией готовность 
урегулировать украинский кризис с привлечением военной силы является не шагом на пути к 
конфронтации, а приглашением к такому диалогу; Benediktov, K. (2014, March 3). Взвешенно и жестко 




fate of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, he [also] decides the fate of Russia, moreover – [the fate of] 
world history” (28.02.2014).44  
In a further echo of the 1968 invasion, the Kremlin, through Izvestiia, mobilizes voices 
from its sphere of influence and control, in this case from another troubled vassal, Chechnya. 
Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov is quoted as saying that “Russia should not leave in trouble 
those who need its help in Ukraine” (“Россия не должна бросать в беде тех, кто нуждается в 
помощи на Украине”).45 Other “expert” voices are also mobilized. In a commentary entitled 
“Ukrainian conundrum” (“Украинская головоломка”) on “why Russia cannot stay indifferent 
to what is going on in the territory of its closest neighbour” (“о том, почему Россия не может 
остаться равнодушной к тому, что происходит на территории ее ближайшего соседа”), 
political scientist Andranik Migranian observes: 
 
(...) with all the respect due to the Ukrainian sovereignty and its territorial integrity, 
if armed clashes and bloodsheds happen in the East, the South [part of Ukraine] or 
in Crimea, it’s hardly likely that the Black Sea Fleet and Russia itself would be able 
to stand on the sidelines of these events. Millions of Russians live in Ukraine and 
millions of people with relatives in Ukraine live in Russia. Russian authorities will 
                                                          
 
44 Перед лицом киевской хунты Путин решает не просто судьбу Крыма и Востока Украины, он решает 
судьбу России, более того - мировой истории; Dugin, A. (2014, February 28). Отказать новой Украине в 
признании [Refuse Recognition to New Ukraine]. Izvestiia, p. 9. Retrieved from 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38975003.  
45 Kashevarova, A. (2014, February 28). Кадыров оценил ситуацию на Украине как госпереворот [Kadyrov 





be put under tremendous pressure in order to defend their own people 
(28.02.2014).46  
 
To build his arguments, Migranian contrasts “the increasing chaos” in Ukraine, which takes 
place “right under Russia’s nose,” to American bombings and similar interventions in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt and Syria – countries “that 99% of the Americans are not likely to 
indicate on a map” (“которые 99% американцев вряд ли покажут на карте”). In this regard, 
the Americans, the author insists, must understand that Russia cannot leave millions of Russians 
and their relatives. To make his arguments even stronger, Migranian refers to General Alexander 
Haig’s words to American President Ronald Reagan, made in the midst of the Cold War, that in 
some cases a situation might occur when “there are more important things than peace” (“есть 
вещи поважнее мира”).   
In terms of journalistic style, Izvestiia relies on highly opinionated and emotionally rich 
items, the knowledge of “experts,” official statements and crafted interviews to strengthen the 
Kremlin’s position on Crimea. In contrast with the dominant commanding tone in the Soviet-era 
Izvestiia, however, the language here is much more vibrant. The post-Soviet texts reveal a 
plurality of discursive genres varying from conversational, literary, ironic and sarcastic to 
experts’ pieces usually written by journalists, philosophers or political scientists, but always 
selected to support the Kremlin’s position. The semantic force of the texts is conveyed through 
analyses, historical references, personal judgments, interpretations or observations connected to 
                                                          
 
46 (…) при всем уважении к украинскому суверенитету и территориальной целостности, если будут 
массовые столкновения и кровопролитие на Востоке, Юге, в Крыму, то вряд ли Черноморский флот, да и 
сама Россия смогут остаться в стороне от этих событий. На Украине проживают миллионы русских, и в 
России миллионы людей, у которых есть родственники на Украине. На российские власти будет оказано 
мощнейшее давление, с тем чтобы защитить своих; Migranian, A. (2014, February 28). Украинская 




the dominant position. Nevertheless, they suggest “a much more nearly equal relation between 
speaker and reader” (Von Seth, 2011, p. 59). In other words, they are more conversational and 
less bureaucratic, but remain abstract and highly emotive.   
In Bakhtinian terms, the semantic force of these messages is additionally reinforced by 
the constant reappearance of culturally shared symbols. As representatives of Russian cultural 
greatness, for instance, icons such as Tolstoy, Chekhov, Dostoevsky, Rublev, Kandinsky, 
Tchaikovsky, and Stravinsky are repeatedly referenced to strengthen patriotic feelings. In an 
article published on February 12, for example, Russian culture is represented metaphorically as 
“a firebird” (“Жар-птица”) that needs to rise: a Russianized reference to the Phoenix myth. As 
the author Egor Kholmogorov (publicist) observes: “For the whole educated and civilized world, 
Russian culture is not a grinning bear with vodka (…) It is a wonderful unimaginable firebird. It 
is time for it to rise from the ashes for us too” (Русская культура для всего образованного и 
цивилизованного мира - это не оскалившийся медведь с водкой (…) Это чудесная 
невообразимая Жар-птица. Пора бы ей уже восстать из пепла и для нас).47  
As for the rhetorical strategies deployed, the analysis reveals an abundance of metaphors 
and epithets. In depicting Russia, for example, predominance is given to “building block”-type 
language such as: great, unique, glorious, noble, spiritual, Orthodox, civilized, protective, moral, 
responsible, superpower, empire, reasonable, cultural, patient, determined, patriotic, peaceful. In 
contrast, the Other, in a broad sense, is addressed as: enemy, imperialist, fascist, American, Nazi, 
Westernish, liberal, radicalized, terrorist, extremist, hysterical, threatening, aggressive, 
marauding, foolish, irresponsible, provocative, hypocrite, insane, hostile. Journalistic voices are 
                                                          
 
47 Kholmogorov, E. (2014, February 12). Возвращение Жар-птицы [Return of the Firebird]. Izvestiia, p. 6. 




conveyed in the Soviet-inspired manner, through the objective modality and “we” form, 
connoting one collective view of unity, duty, and solidarity, with “our people,” or “Russian-
speakers” in Ukraine.  
Drawing on such highly charged rhetoric, the predominant style is best described as 
publicist, defined by Pasti (2005) as “literature on public-political issues” (p. 111). The post-
Soviet publicist, as Pasti points out, usually addresses a particular factual news story but in a 
literary format, using a much more “expressive, emotional, ironic and witty” style supported by 
personal judgments and comments in order to draw specific conclusions (p. 111). Referring to 
the genre of ocherk, a “kind of journalistic essay,” such texts represent a unique journalistic 
genre characterized by “in-depth discussion of a particular problem in which the author 
expresses his or her own thoughts and emotions and aims to evoke the emotions of the reader” 
(Voltmer, 2000, p. 478).  
The article “Valkyries and Muses,” published on February 28, provides an explicit 
example of Russian publicist free-styling. The author identified in a by-line as “Maksim 
Kononenko, journalist,” provides a discussion on revolutions as cultural symbols. To build his 
arguments, he contrasts the glory of the French and Russian revolutions to the contemporary 
“ersatz” revolutions in “mass consumption” such as “Made in the US, assembled in China” or 
“the latest Ukrainian” revolution. According to Kononenko, the cultural consequence of the 
“assembled in China”-type revolution is merely to go to war with monuments and cultural 
symbols, while the “latest Ukrainian revolution” is nothing more than the replacement of 
Mayakovsky and Rodchenko (here another reference to Soviet classics) with the Ukrainian 
singer Ruslana. Thus, Kononenko constructs a highly sophisticated narrative, underscored with 




and present while alluding to the spiritual emptiness of Western consumerism, the apparent and 
inevitable outcome of Ukrainian alignment with the West.48 Throughout the period under 
examination, such opinionated items, contrasting Russia to some culturally inferior Other, 
written by journalists, publicists, politicians or “writers” are regularly cycled through Izvestiia’s 
coverage.  
In terms of the sociocultural practices or the broader context within which the events in 
Ukraine are portrayed, the following interconnected frames are identified as building blocks of 
the Kremlin’s concern for controlling the common post-Soviet identity. 
Russia’s greatness and duty to protect it frames Russia’s historic greatness and the 
attendant responsibility of the Russian people and State to protect such a legacy. This is clearly 
evident in the sample texts. The “greatness frame” builds its arguments on a glorious past, 
common language, and Orthodox Christianity, values that are used to legitimize the Kremlin’s 
decision to disregard its neighbour’s sovereignty and to enter Ukrainian territory. Moreover, it 
confirms the argument that “Putin appears to believe that the revival of a strong state and the 
unification of society through a pride of belonging to it represent the only way” for Russia to 
move forward (Tolz, 2001, p. 279). In this regard, some rhetorical strategies deserve particular 
attention.   
The notions of “empire,” “superpower,” and the “Third Rome” reappear repeatedly as 
fundamental characteristics of the Russian world. Following this line, Izvestiia’s coverage 
reasserts the rightness of the Kremlin’s position as the only rational and natural decision in order 
                                                          
 





to establish the “empire of good” (“империя добра,” 25.03.2014).49 The independence of 
Ukraine is consistently portrayed as an “historical mistake” that should be fixed since “the 
preservation of Ukraine in its existing boundaries” is seen as “not historically neither ethnically 
nor legally grounded.”  Rather, it is portrayed as supported by an “anti-Russian vector” with the 
goal of Ukraine falling as soon as possible under “the guarantee umbrella of the EU and NATO” 
(“под зонтиком гарантий ЕС и НАТО,” 11.03.2014).50  
This position is strengthened by the recurring theme that most Russians believe Crimea is 
Russian territory, and the depiction of Russian soldiers in Ukraine as “patriots” (“патриоты”) 
and “militias” (“ополченцы”). In this vein, Russian President Vladimir Putin is actually 
portrayed as a peaceable protector who “has never declared or will declare war on Ukraine and 
its people.” Rather, “we are talking about the need to protect hundreds of thousands of Russian 
citizens” (03.03.2014).51 It is worth noting here that the “millions” we have discussed above are 
now replaced by “hundreds of thousands.” This may be closer to the truth, but according to 
Izvestiia’s coverage it is still impossible to say exactly how many Russians inhabit Crimea.  
The notion of empire is recurrent. The events surrounding the Crimean referendum are 
addressed as not only an historical mistake, but as revenge for its “illegal” separation from the 
old Soviet Union. Once again, an implied threat is disguised as a reasonable argument to boost 
the case for Crimea’s reunification with Russia, in order to gather together “the Russian lands.” 
This “historical revenge” is seen as “a struggle with no rules” that Russia has been waiting to 
                                                          
 
49 Melent’ev, S. (2014, March 25). Становление империи добра [Establishing the Empire of Good]. Izvestiia 
online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/568110.  
50 Kholmogorov, E. (2014, March 11). Собирание земель русских [Gathering of the Lands of the Russians]. 
Izvestiia, p. 1. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/39069713.    
51 Президент России Владимир Путин никогда не объявлял и не объявит войну Украине и ее народу. Речь 
идет о необходимости защиты сотен тысяч граждан России; Kadyrov, R. (2014, March 3). Ярошей скоро не 
станет, а нам жить в мире и согласии [It won’t Become Iaroshei Soon, but We Have to Live in Peace and 




enact for 23 years (since the dissolution of the USSR).52 The following passage illustrates the 
emotive intent of the language around Russia’s “awakening:”  
 
You too aggressively have buried the Soviet Union over the post-Soviet space, but 
now, exactly now, March 1-2, 2014, you finally, dazedly, begin to recognize that 
the rumors about the dead of a hateful superpower turned out to be premature. Too 
premature. [You finally begin to recognize] that our heads and hands – of our 
people, power, President of the RF, parliament, and government – they are all set in 
motion by these Soviet feelings, will and judgment (…) Finally, the USSR came out 
of a coma and shock, and began restoring order in its homeland Soviet space. (…) 
Yes, the events in the last few days – they reproduce statements and actions of the 
USSR, of its spirit, will and might (03.03.2014).53  
 
In connection to the concepts of “empire” and “superpower,” the awakening of Russia is 
constantly portrayed through “the firebird” metaphor, or “shaking off the dust.” In turn, the need 
for a new ideology seems urgent. This is revealed in an article published on February 14 in 
which “historians, economists, journalists, and experts responsible for the ideology in Soviet 
times” have been invited to contribute to a new, Russia-centric way of thinking (“в ее 
                                                          
 
52 Kholmogorov, E. (2014, March 11). Собирание земель русских [Gathering of the Lands of the Russians]. 
Izvestiia, p.1. Retrieved from http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/39069713.  
53  Вы слишком настойчиво хоронили СССР на постсоветском пространстве, но теперь, именно 
теперь, 1-2 марта 2014 года, вы наконец-таки с изумлением начинаете сознавать, что слухи о смерти 
ненавистной сверхдержавы оказались преждевременными. Слишком преждевременными. Что нашими 
головами и руками - и народа, и власти, и президента РФ, и парламента, и правительства - движут именно 
эти - советские чувства, воля и разум (…) СССР наконец-таки (!!!) вышел из комы и шока и начал наводить 
порядок на своем родном советском пространстве (…) Да, события последних суток - это заявления и 
действия СССР, его духа, его воли, его мощи; Roganov, S. (2014, March 3). Детский лепет западной политики 




разработке принимают участие историки, экономисты, журналисты, специалисты, 
отвечавшие за идеологию еще в советское время”). In addition, it is explicitly stated that “any 
concept of Russia’s progress must contain the imperial idea” (“любая концепция развития 
России должна содержать в себе имперскую идею”). The three main postulates of the 
imperial idea are further developed as: first, Russian imperial history; second, Holy Russia (the 
Third Rome, namely Moscow as the capital of the Eastern Orthodox Christianity) as “the red 
avant-garde of the Earth” (“красный авангард Земли”); and third, a new elite, “fully committed 
to the development of the country.”54  
Another reconstruction of Russia’s imperial greatness can be found in the repurposing of 
the old tsarist concept of New Russia (Novorossiia).55 This is largely attributed to spokespeople 
representing the highly disputed, self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics.56 It 
is a controversial term, particularly in its deployment following the much-disputed annexation of 
Crimea, yet is frequently mobilized in Izvestiia’s texts as a booster for common patriotic 
feelings, and in support of the “people’s guards” in Donetsk and Lugansk. For example, in an 
article published in July, Sergei Mironov, who is a famous Russian politician, explains that the 
ideas expressed during the Crimean referendum are shared not only by “millions of citizens of 
New Russia,” but also by “millions in Russia,” which is declared as a proof for the ambition to 
overcome “the historical ruptures of Russian history” (“преодолеть исторические разрывы 
                                                          
 
54 Podosenov, S. (2014, February 14). СПЧ и НАК разработают идеологию развития страны [SPCH and NAK 
Elaborate the Ideological Growth of the Country]. Izvestiia, p.1. Retrieved from 
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/38881191.  
55 The term dates to the late 18th century, when Catherine the Great won lands near the Black Sea after a series of 
wars with the Ottomans and created a governorate known as “New Russia.” 
56 Following the referendum in Crimea in March, referendums on the status of Donetsk and Lugansk took place in 
May 2014. The results, however, were not recognised by any government, except the Russian. Moscow stated its 
“respect” for people’s decision. See more in Tsoi, D. (2014, May 12). Донецк и Луганск объявили независимость 




русской истории”). The same text by Mironov addresses two other prevailing ideas in building 
pro-Russian narratives – that of the Russian Orthodox tradition and of Vladimir Putin as the 
guardian of Russianness: 
 
(…) the people in New Russia and Russia identify themselves with the Russian 
Orthodox tradition – not in its purely ecclesiastical [form] but in a broader sense. 
This is revealed by sociological surveys for about 80% of the citizens of our 
country. (...) These 80% are the same people who today support Vladimir Putin and 
expect from him to strengthen the Russian state. Finally, these are the same people 
who are proud of our army – the army which crossed the Alps, stopped Napoleon, 
saved Russia during the years of the Great Patriotic [war] and very recently 
protected the population of Crimea from the fate that later overtook Donetsk and 
Lugansk (31.07.2014).57  
 
Even prior to the referendums on the status of Donetsk and Lugansk, the term “New 
Russia” is discussed by Igor Karaulov – a poet and translator – as indicative of two 
interdependent concepts. Under the headline “Meet New Russia!” (“Встречайте 
Новороссию!”), the author explains that “New Russia” alludes to the notion of independence, 
but also to the notion of “the unbreakable connection” of these regions to Russia. Furthermore, 
                                                          
 
57 (…) в Новороссии и в России люди идентифицируют себя с русской православной традицией — не в 
сугубо церковном, но в более широком ее понимании. Таковых, как показывают социологические опросы, 
около 80% граждан нашей страны (…) это те самые 80%, которые сегодня поддерживают Владимира 
Путина и ожидают от него укрепления российского государства. Наконец, это те самые люди, которые 
гордятся нашей армией — переходившей Альпы, остановившей Наполеона, спасшей Россию в годы 
Великой Отечественной и совсем недавно защитившей население Крыма от той участи, которая позднее 
постигла жителей Донецка и Луганска; Mironov, S. (2014, July 31). Новороссия — Новая Россия [Novorossiia 




Karaulov asserts that an “Eastern Slavonic triad is rising, formed from the common cultural and 
territorial ground of “Russia, Belarussia, New Russia”” (“воссоздается восточнославянская 
триада, на этот раз в форме “Россия, Белоруссия, Новороссия,” 06.05.2014).58 It is 
noteworthy that Karaulov employs Belarussia (the older Soviet name of Belarus), not the name 
that independent Belarusians use for their country.   
As late as June, “New Russia” is connected to the broader concept of the Russian world 
and culture by contrasting the concept with “the Ukrainian nationalists” and “Western Nazis,” 
which are described as “criminal unities” (“криминальные объединения,” 03.06.2014).59 Even 
the breaking news about the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 on July 17, 2014 is 
appropriated for the cause. The headline “The crash of Malaysian Boeing takes the lives of 298 
people,” is followed by the subheading “The leadership of New Russia considers the destruction 
of the liner as a planned provocation of Kyiv” (“Руководство Новороссии считает 
уничтожение лайнера спланированной провокацией Киева”).60 Further, Western accusations 
regarding Russia’s responsibility for the crash are completely disregarded. Rather, they are used 
as a counter-argument against “the Western propaganda” in order to justify “the battle for 
Ukraine as a stage in the struggle for a new world order” (29.07.2014).61  
The Western insanity is another frame that reappears throughout Izvestiia’s coverage. It 
stands in contrast to the theme of Russian reasonableness and will for justice and peace. In this 
                                                          
 
58 Karaulov, I. (2014, May 6). Встречайте Новороссию! [Meet Novorossiia!]. Izvestiia online. Retrieved from 
http://izvestia.ru/news/570410.  
59 Chalenko, A. (2014, June 3). Территория закона [Territory of Law]. Izvestiia online. Retrieved from 
http://izvestia.ru/news/571890.  
60 Gridasov, A. & Petelin, G. (2014, July 17). Крушение малайзийского Boeing унесло жизни 298 человек [The 
Crash of Malaysian Boeing Takes the Lives of 298 People]. Izvestiia online. Retrieved from 
http://izvestia.ru/news/574010.  
61 Migranian, A. (2014, July 29). Битва за Украину как этап в борьбе за новый миропорядок [The Battle for 





frame, every Russian move towards Ukraine is justified as absolutely reasonable and rational as 
opposed to the West’s “nonsense” or “madness” in Iraq and Libya. This can be seen as an 
obvious reminiscence of the differentiation technique, as discussed by Barukh Hazan (1982) or, 
in modern terms, as an example of whataboutism suggesting that any criticism should be put in a 
different context with the reverse question “What about…” In 1968, such a technique was 
largely deployed by Izvestiia with regards to the US actions in Vietnam and the Middle East; in 
2014 it takes the form of “what about Iraq or Libya.”  
In this light, Western logic regarding Ukraine is ironically portrayed as “deadly” 
(убийственная) whereas Western readers, according to Izvestiia, “support Putin and laugh at 
Obama” (26.06.2014; 07.03.2014). Within the same anti-Western rhetoric, the US and its leaders 
are usually metonymically addressed as “America,” “the Americans.” Their “Ukrainian puppets” 
(марионетки) are regularly framed with epithets derivative of “insanity” because they are 
incapable of understanding Russian logic. Such a sarcastic tone, as the following extract 
illustrates, is mobilized even by Vladimir Putin in one of his early assessments of Western 
responses to the actions in Ukraine: 
 
Sometimes I get the impression that over there, beyond the big puddle, somewhere 
in America, are sitting in some kind of a laboratory, assistants doing some kind of 
experiments as if with lab rats, without even comprehending the consequences of 
what are they doing (…) Why was it necessary to do that? Who can explain it? 
There are no explanations at all (04.03.2014).62  
                                                          
 
62 У меня иногда складывается впечатление, что там, за большой лужей, сидят где-то в Америке сотрудники 





The Other’s mental inability to understand the real situation in Ukraine is developed from the 
very beginning of the protests in Kyiv, as reflected in the following excerpt: 
 
The events in Ukraine resemble a political thriller: spectacular, with special effects, 
with an unknown ending. Those coming to Maidan, immediately succumb to this 
romance and make reports with creepy and touching details, trying to convey the 
feeling, the atmosphere. Everyone wants drive-up. Everyone wants to feel Ukraine 
(…). Few want to understand it. Everyone wants to watch a movie. As if it is a 
movie about another planet, not about a neighboring country (04.02.2014).63  
 
Faced by such a paradoxical indifference and lack of understanding of the real issues of the day, 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine are over-and-over presented as the only rational and logical choice to 
be made.  
The final dominant frame in Izvestiia’s coverage concerns conspiracy, farce and the 
boomerang effect. In portraying the “Western conspiracy” in Ukraine as a “farсe” (06.03.2014), 
the newspaper illustrates “liberal attempts” to democratize countries such as Iraq as examples of 
Washington’s ineptitude. Metaphorically, an article from July 1, compares American politics to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
что они делают (…) Зачем надо было вот это сделать? Кто может объяснить? Объяснений нет вообще 
никаких; Sozaev-Gur’ev, E. (2014, March 4). Путин: «На Украине произошел вооруженный захват власти» [A 
military coup d’état took place in Ukraine]. Izvestiia online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/566953.  
63 Украинские события похожи на политический боевик: захватывающий, со спецэффектами, с неизвестным 
финалом. Те, кто приезжает на майдан, тут же поддаются этой романтике и ведут репортажи с жуткими и 
трогательными деталями, стремясь передать ощущение, атмосферу. Всем хочется драйва. Все хотят 
чувствовать Украину (…) Мало кто хочет ее понимать. Все хотят смотреть кино. Как будто это кино про 
другую планету, а не про соседнюю страну; Fedorova, A. (2014, January 31). Романтика народного насилия 




reverse Midas-touch where “… if Midas turned into gold everything he touched, everything that 
the US touches beyond its own territory – in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt, Syria 
– turns into ashes, chaos“ (01.07.2014).64 Within the same article, the American politics of 
rapprochement of its “marionettes in Kyiv” with NATO and the EU is seen as the reason for “a 
civil war” in Ukraine.  
In the same vein, the sanctions imposed by Washington on Russia are trivialized as 
nothing serious, with no effect on Russia’s rightness and greatness. Rather, they are discussed 
within the “boomerang effect” suggesting that Washington and its allies will suffer more than 
Russia for the sake of their actions (17.07.2014).65 The same “boomerang effect” appears in 
early Izvestiia’s articles, right after the Kremlin’s decision to send troops into Ukraine “for 
normalization of the societal-political environment in the country” (03.03.2014). The author 
points out that “For now, Russia strikes back. In response to the offensive statements of Obama, 
[Russian] senators have proposed to recall the Russian ambassador in Washington.” Discussing 
the sanctions that the US and the European Union might apply against Russia, the author admits 
that “such a ‘punishment’ on the part of Brussels and Washington would be painful for 
Moscow”; however, “… today, in practical terms, the US has no significant trade with Russia,” 
and therefore, Washington’s economic sanctions “won’t lead to great harm for Moscow.” Rather, 
the European Union is the one that will suffer more.66  
                                                          
 
64 Сравнивая американцев с фригийским царем Мидасом, можно сказать, что если всё, к чему прикасался 
Мидас, превращалось в золото, то всё, к чему прикасались США за пределами собственной территории: в 
Югославии, Ираке, Афганистане, Ливии, Египте, Сирии, а сегодня и на Украине — превращается в 
пепелище, хаос и неуправляемость; Migranian, A. (2014, July 1). От Клинтона до Обамы [From Clinton to 
Obama]. Izvestiia online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/573291.  
65 Sozaev-Gur’ev, E. (2014, July 17). Путин: ‘Санкции имеют эффект бумеранга [Putin: ‘Sanctions Have a 
Boomerang Effect]. Izvestiia online. Retrieved from http://izvestia.ru/news/573960.  
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In an article published on August 7, the headline ironically indicates that “Russia will 
survive without hamon [a type of Spanish ham], oysters and Roquefort,” an allusion to bourgeois 
values. What is more important, the imposed sanctions are seen as yet another reason to protect 
Russia’s national interests and to encourage its own potential in terms of domestic products, 
depicted as “irreplaceable,” “with no chemistry,” and “beneficial for people’s health” 
(07.08.2014; 06.08.2014).67  
The aforementioned findings provide compelling evidence for striking parallels and 
continuity of the old Soviet journalistic techniques and rhetorical strategies into post-Soviet 
times. However, they also reveal some important operational differences between the Kremlin’s 
regime of truth, then and now. Overall, the post-Soviet Izvestiia relies significantly on anti-
Western rhetoric in justifying the Kremlin’s decisions regarding Ukraine. Such explicit Cold 
War strategies position Russia and its ruling elite not only as the good battling the bad guys but 
also serves as a dominant argument for constructing the concept of the post-Soviet Russian Idea.  
The following concluding chapter will consider the evidence presented here to flesh out the 
similarities and differences between then and now, and to discuss how the study of journalistic 
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East versus West Journalistic Practices: Concluding Remarks 
 
To revisit a central concept within this thesis, according to Foucault (1980), each society 
has its “regime of truth” (p. 131). Such regimes are produced and transmitted through particular 
discourses, mechanisms and instances – army, education, media – controlled by those in power 
until official truth becomes received truth. The Truth, therefore becomes a system “of ordered 
procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements” 
(p. 133). As Foucault suggests, language and, particularly language deployed by a regime within 
journalistic texts can be made to serve as tools to influence those whom the regime wishes to 
control.  
In order to survive, the regime of Soviet truth created its own methods of control. What 
Tikhomirov (2013) terms a regime of Soviet “forced trust” was based on simultaneously 
generating faith in the central power – by setting up channels for distributing it – and maintaining 
a high level of generalized distrust at the same time (p. 80). The regime of Soviet forced trust 
“enabled emotional mobilization of the population and establishment of discipline in order to 
create a multi-layered social differentiation of the population, dividing it into ‘friends’ and 
‘enemies’” (Tikhomirov, 2013, p. 80). 
Ironically, twenty-five years after the old Soviet regime, ostensibly, came to an end, the 
post-Soviet regime seems to operate within the same antagonistic boundaries of trust and 
distrust, mobilizing the same aggressive but emotive language as a crucial tool for submission to 
its artificially constructed regime of truth. In this light, if language and journalistic texts serve as 




barometer of Izvestiia indicates a retrogression in Russian journalism and its practices to a 
communist model of control, rather than a model of glasnost’ or openness that showed itself, 
briefly, following the fall of the Communist regime.  
This is revealed by the discourse and framing analysis of both communist and post-
communist journalism perspectives, as reflected in Izvestiia in portraying two key events of the 
old and new Cold War. Did the new realities, then, tangibly change the way journalism in post-
Soviet Russia is done, at least in terms of its rhetorical and discursive manifestation? As the 
analysis demonstrates, the answer is no. Even though the old patterns of the Cold War are 
confronted by the new reality – new digital technologies, the Internet, and the collapse of the 
Communist regime – the rhetoric and discursive constructions of Izvestiia’s texts have been 
aided and abetted by new technologies of dissemination. In other words, the aims and objectives 
of message control, originating in the Kremlin, remain largely unchanged even as it has become 
easier for the regime to circulate its constructed reality. Such ease of circulation simply gives the 
state leadership the appearance of being more “modern” than it really is.   
The findings, therefore, substantiate the hypothesis that despite the collapse of the Soviet 
Communist regime in 1989 and the consequent political, social and economic changes that 
occurred in Russia, the Soviet past still guides the rhetorical and discursive intentions of the 
contemporary Russian regime. Of greater importance, the pro-Kremlin press today still serves as 
an important ideological and propaganda tool, operating in a different sociocultural setting, but 
still maintaining those in power through the old techniques. First among these techniques is the 
re-purposing and adaptation of Cold War discourses in order to build contemporary Russian 
nation-state narratives and imaginaries. The ideological difference consists of the replacement of 




Communism. As the analysis aimed to demonstrate, Izvestiia has been appropriated to build the 
Russian Idea on the notions of a strong state, a shared Russian culture, patriotism, and a belief in 
Russian greatness. All is meant to serve Vladimir Putin’s vision of the core values of 
Russianness, as expressed in his Millennium Manifesto, and has been used to reveal that Izvestiia 
strictly follows the Kremlin’s line.  
In an Orwellian sense, the contemporary newspeak of the Russian state, as reflected by 
Izvestiia, suggests neither deviation from, nor a contradiction to the Kremlin’s regime of truth. 
Journalists in the pro-Kremlin news media, then, still act more as propagandists or “educators” 
disseminating, in Foucauldian terms, knowledge in support of the only possible official truth, 
rather than as dispassionate observers and critics. Of course, confronted by new social, cultural, 
economic and technological realities, fragments of the past are mobilized in a different context 
by the newly evolved Kremlin’s newspeak, but new content is certainly crafted to fit previously 
used patterns. Both the Soviet and post-Soviet incarnations of Izvestiia circulated nation-state 
narratives of Soviet and Russian greatness in constant opposition to an imaginary Other, 
mobilizing the discourses of fear and protection. In both 1968 and 2014, there is no deviation 
from the dominant Kremlin line. This suggests that the highly instrumentalized role for Izvestiia 
has been maintained. Even if a certain strain of plurality is on display, it is more accurately a 
plurality of social actors (in the most literal sense) writing in accordance with the dominant view, 
rather than a plurality of different voices and opinions that circulate free of constraint.  
It should be noted that the post-Soviet Izvestiia is much more vibrant and witty, when 
compared to its predecessor. However, this does not mean it is more “professional,” at least in 
the Western sense of the word. Rather, the journalistic language deployed is less bureaucratic 




no room for objectivity or criticism of the dominant view. The newspaper still retains many of 
the old rhetorical strategies that take the form of emotionally rich outbursts or vague headlines to 
produce arguments in support of those in power. Undoubtedly, this seems problematic since if 
then, in Soviet times, the techniques of master-minding the public’s consciousness – through 
language – represented an integral, obligatory part of the repertoire of the Soviet regime, today 
the same techniques, built on a Manichean paradigm are vigorously employed by Russian 
journalists when it comes to marshalling public opinion. The recurring journalistic techniques 
can be summarized as follows:  
 
Polarization technique – “forces of evil” versus “forces of good”  
Manicheism – black or white, out of context 
Pre-constructed threat as a reason to act against an enemy 
Whataboutism 
Partial facts or historical context as justification 
Irony and sarcasm  
Experts’ knowledge 
 
In addition, all arguments and counter-arguments are presented as if they represent the personal 
point of view of journalists, thus assuming legitimacy. But this is done at the expense of 
providing no new information or “news.” To illustrate this, it is noteworthy that after reading 
hundreds of Izvestiia’s pages regarding Ukraine and Crimea, some basic “facts” remain unclear. 




Russian-speaking people in Crimea. This is no small matter. The Kremlin’s claim on Crimea is 
predicated on “saving” and “protecting” its cultural citizens on the peninsula. 
In turn, the journalistic style, in both periods, is highly opinionated, “publicist,” 
conversational, and subjective rather than objective. The paternalistic, educative and elevated 
tone is maintained, quite often suggesting and promoting a dominant position over the public. 
The tone of the texts positions journalists, writers or other “experts,” vis-à-vis the Izvestiia 
readership, as propagators of specific and exclusive knowledge represented as the Truth, rather 
than as common knowledge shared among peers. As a result, instead of asserting critical thinking 
or igniting debate, as should be the role of the news media in a “fourth estate” journalistic model, 
the semantic force of the texts switches from commands and warnings to a more interpretative 
vein of analysis, judgements, and in-depth philosophical discussions simulating a dialogue but in 
practice representing a monologue.  
In such a system of “top down” information flow it is useful to map out the types of 




Pre-constructed threat Anxiety 
The self-definition is impossible without the 
enemy image 
The self-definition is impossible without 
demonizing the enemy  
Conspiracy and counterrevolution Conspiracy and coup d’etat 
Historical gratitude – Normalization  Historical injustice – Normalization  




The Soviet Union as saviour Russia as Motherland 
Emotional clues  Emotional clues  
Irony  Sarcasm 
From Homo Sovieticus  To Great Russia  
 
In both periods, the similarities in discourses, mobilized by the regime, can be readily 
traced. An opposition remains between a projection of the enemy as “Western,” “fascist,” 
“conspiratorial” and “insane,” and self-legitimation as “protectionist,” “rational,” and 
“historically logical.” Furthermore, in both periods, events on the ground are placed within the 
basic dichotomy of Us versus Them, in order to construct the overarching grand discourse of 
Soviet/Russian greatness. Ideologically, both Czechoslovakia and Ukraine are regarded as part of 
the Soviet or Russian sphere of influence. The audiences in each case are appealed to as reliable 
and predictable “comrades” or “brothers.” In this regard, both the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
and the Russian intervention in Ukraine are seen as protecting and legitimizing the Self, whether 
the Self is the Soviet bloc or the Russian Idea. The difference is that under Brezhnev, the news 
media propagated an “imagined community” of a happy and flourishing Soviet brotherhood with 
zero tolerance for the imperialist capitalist Other. Under Vladimir Putin, a different type of 
“imagined community” has been constructed, one in which the enemy image is portrayed as a 
threat against and a legitimation for the Russian national identity. The threatening factor, in the 
contemporary pro-Kremlin discourse, therefore, further builds on the classical dichotomy that 
conflates protection of Russianness and Russian culture with hatred toward an imagined enemy.  
The discursive construction of the Russian Idea, however, mobilizes something that is 




Stigmatized by the old Communist regime, today’s distinctly Russian Church is back as a 
compelling symbol, discursively constructed by Izvestiia as a unifying signifier for Russianness. 
The findings, therefore, support observations from a number of scholars, concerning Putin’s 
apparent conservative Orthodox sympathies (Malykhina, 2014; Slade, 2005; Gorham, 2014). 
What is more important, the Orthodox values, as mobilized by the pro-Kremlin media, including 
Izvestiia, refer to another mythical construction – that of the Russian empire. As Malykhina 
(2014) observes:  
 
Over the course of Putin’s rule, it has become increasingly clear that the Orthodox 
Church is playing a similar role to the one it played during the Imperial period. (…) 
Kremlin ideologists gloss over the role of the Orthodox Church “as the only major 
social institution to have survived their nation’s turbulent history.” Meanwhile 
Russian liberal leaders have less tolerance for overtly religious overtones in public 
discourse and expect a more nuances assessment of Russia’s historical connections, 
particularly careful phrasing of the idea of Moscow being the Third Rome and its 
profoundly anti-Western orientation to avoid misunderstanding. Putin, who speaks 
this way, only confirms suspicions that such simplicities of faith, and a habit of 
seeing a hideously complicated Russian world in black and white fashion, may 
bring the survival of religious nationalism (p. 53). 
 
It is also noteworthy that Vladimir Putin is the first Russian leader, after perestroika of a 
constitutionally guaranteed secular Russian state to openly exhibit “religious sentiments.” 




and nation at an Orthodox Christmas service in 2000, proclaiming “that [Orthodoxy is] an 
unbending spiritual core of the entire people and state” (p. 54). This stance is reflected in pro-
Kremlin journalistic practices wherein the news media implicitly support the regime’s pro-
Church position and precisely adjust their tone to Kremlin initiatives.  
Indeed, the newly evolved newspeak neither deviates from nor contradicts the ruling view 
where the Orthodox Church is concerned. The Orthodox tradition has been incorporated into the 
Russian Idea – along with other common cultural symbols – as a resurrection of Russian imperial 
glory. The essence of the “national question” for Russia, as Putin sees it, and as it is reflected in 
Izvestiia’s coverage, is a “civilizational identity that is based on the preservation of a Russian 
cultural dominance where differentiation between “us” and “them” is determined by a common 
culture and shared values” (Malykhina, 2014, p. 50). 
In addition, the contrast-and-compare analysis of communist and post-communist 
Russian press texts, as reflected in the study of Izvestiia, poses some important questions 
regarding journalism as a central component of an effective public sphere and its role in civil 
society in democratic states. By turning the focus on Russia, the analysis in this thesis aimed to 
not only “open a window” onto the Russian world (as conveyed discursively by the media for 
internal Russian consumption), but also to provoke critical thinking on the way Western “liberal” 
journalistic standards contradict or overlap with certain Russian principles of what the profession 
stands for.   
With respect to this line of thought, a question that might occur is: Isn’t it obvious that 
the Western understanding of the role of the media in a democratic society has nothing to do 
with the pro-Kremlin standpoint? Drawing on Habermas (1996), journalism and political 




sphere which refers to the space of civil society situated between the legislative power and 
citizens. In this vein, the power of the media, as Habermas sees it, is “to understand themselves 
as mandatory of an enlightened public whose willingness to learn and capacity for criticism they 
at once presuppose, demand and reinforce; like the judiciary, they ought to preserve their 
independence from political and social pressure” (p. 378). 
In other words, at least ideally, the media should act in a socially responsible manner, 
serving the public interest by providing objective reporting, thereby enhancing civil dialogue and 
critical engagement. The question of how media should act in theory, and how do they act in 
practice, of course, is contested even within the Western tradition but such a discussion goes 
beyond the goals of this thesis. What is important here is that major and dominant news media 
outlets in Russia, and Izvestiia certainly fits into this category, serve a different purpose from 
their Western counterparts.  
Regardless of the fact that the 1993 Constitution of Russia guarantees freedom of 
expression and prohibits censorship, the specifics of the Russian cultural, historical, and political 
identity, used by those in power, hinder the influence of Western models.68 Those in power 
encourage a specific Russian adaptation of liberal-democratic concepts to create journalistic 
principles that have little or nothing to do with core liberal imperatives such as free speech or 
plurality of voices. This might have been expected during the Soviet era, but one of the more 
surprising findings from the Izvestiia study is the extent to which Putin has blatantly 
appropriated Soviet discursive strategies and tactics. 
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If there is a difference, it is that Putin’s regime of truth operates by looking back 
to a glorified and largely mythical Russian pre-Soviet past, rather than forward to the 
creation of a just and dynamic “real” New Russia. Of course, this maintains the privilege 
of those in power, but does little to address current problems or future concerns. It is a 
strangely conservative worldview, but one that seems to work. The absence of rational 
and critical debate in Izvestiia’s texts has not hurt Vladimir Putin in the least. The vast 
majority of Russians support their president and continue to vote for him. 
In this regard, the pro-Kremlin news media may be viewed as the key to 
understanding the complexities of political life in Russia. This opens the possibility for 
further research, an empirical study in support of a wider exploration of the impact of 
news media – all news media in Russia – on political decision-making processes. In 
addition, further research into the Cold War framework, contrasting both Russian and 
Western news media as a mobilizing factor for political approval, would update our 
understanding of the differences and similarities between the two journalistic forms. This 
is important for the understanding of how journalism operates in different socio-cultural 
contexts. Such a study would include an exploration of media effects on audiences, 
something that is largely relegated to anecdote in the Izvestiia study. 
In some respects this is already happening. Most current scholars understand that 
it is naive to characterize the Russian public as a passive mass bystander reduced, in 
Lippmann’s terms, to a “phantom” that merely observes the Kremlin’s strategic game. In 
fact, the results of a series of recent focus groups conducted across Russia demonstrate 
that “Russian citizens are surprisingly sophisticated when it comes to decoding media 




aware of the biases in news reports and are able to question the underlying 
communicative intentions in a story. At the same time, representative surveys carried out 
after the Duma elections in Russia in 1999 and 2003 show a close correlation between 
voter choice and exposure to television news (Voltmer, 2010, p. 148).  
The surveys reveal that voters who relied mainly on state television were 
significantly more likely to vote for the Kremlin-supported party, United Russia, than 
those who watched commercial television. This is further evidence that the Kremlin fully 
understands the power of control over news media as a powerful mobilizing factor for 
will-formation. The degree to which the pro-Kremlin oriented channels contribute to a 
political mobilization and engagement, however, deserves further examination.   
A final possibility for future research arising from the Izvestiia study is to address 
journalists and editors who work for the pro-Kremlin news media. This object of study 
recognizes that reducing the Russian news media to mere ideological machines runs the 
risk of neglecting the subjective perceptions and motivations of those who produce the 
Kremlin’s content. Of course, it can be assumed that some of these journalists have no 
choice but to do what they are told. However, structured and semi-structured interviews 
with editors, reporters and other journalistic contributors such as “experts” would reveal 
personal motives, agendas and general perceptions that would significantly enhance our 
insight into the way that Russian journalists deal with institutional control mechanisms. 
Such a study might include a comparison between what journalists think of offline and 
online/alternative domestic Russian media, and domestic and international pro-Kremlin 
channels. This has the potential to enrich the range of comprehension on journalistic 




To conclude, if the press texts serve as barometers of social and political change, 
the Izvestiia study indicates that little has changed significantly in terms of media-power 
dynamics in Russia.  The news coverage continues to follow the Kremlin’s line and 
portrays the world in the long-established way of Us versus Them binary. Indeed, the 
Kremlin has had some success in exporting this basic communication strategy. When 
Canada’s Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, recently suggested that Russia will be unable 
to return to the G7 talks as long as Vladimir Putin is in power, Putin responded by saying 
that the United States would make the decision on whether he would have a seat at the 
table. “I don't want to offend anyone, but if the United States says Russia should be 
returned to the G8, [Canada's] prime minister will change his opinion,” Putin told 
journalists.69 This was the equivalent of an international slap in the face, a suggestion that 
Harper should keep quiet and let the big historic players – Russia and the US – make the 
decisions. It is no secret that Harper has been an adamant critic of the Russian annexation 
of Crimea and a staunch supporter of Ukraine. It should come as no surprise that Putin 
would infer that Canada is to America what Ukraine is to Russia: a wrongheaded upstart 
in need of “education.” 
As for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, recently released statistics re-affirm the 
efficacy of the Kremlin’s approach. A survey conducted by the Levada Center (a Russian 
non-governmental research organization) in March 2014 – the month of the referendum 
in Crimea – showed that almost 90 per cent of Russians supported the unification with 
Crimea, while the majority of respondents – 62 per cent – believed that Russia has been 
                                                          
 






guided in its policy towards Ukraine “by a desire to protect the rights of ethnic Russians 
in Crimea and Ukraine and to ensure their prosperity.”70 In July 2014, Putin’s approval 
rating grew to a record-breaking 86 per cent among Russians, a level at which it remains 
as of this chapter’s writing in June 2015.71 Further illustrating the effectiveness of Cold 
War discourse across a period of decades, Russian disapproval of the US rises every 
month while approval by Russians of the West, in general, continues to fall.72  
As Russia continues to redraw the map in Ukraine, the media narrative is once 
again split between East and West. Izvestiia has shown us that the resurrection of Cold 
War rhetoric is not only evident, but effective. Is it at all possible to recognize the Truth 
in the different journalistic portrayals of the events in Ukraine? As Foucault (1980) 
suggests, it is important to think of the political problems not in terms of ideologies but in 
terms of “truth” and “power” (p. 132). Within the new media battle over Ukraine, the 
Truth remains an open question. The “power” behind the “truth” is there for all to see. 
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Appendix 1:  







A sample of selected items from January to June 1968, representative of the general themes, 
organized by theme, key words, date of publication, and type of publication – factual news, 
opinion piece, interview or official statement. 













Positive/Abstract Comradeship, fraternal Czechoslovakia, productive cooperation 










Friends, young people, Warsaw Pact, peace efforts, against 













Human history, military partnership (боевое содружество), 












Czechoslovakia, strong unit of the Warsaw Pact, fight for 
democracy and peace on Earth, progressive/working people on 
Earth against world capitalism 



































Communist Party, working class, Lenin, history, imperialist 














Dear comrades, comradeship, Nazi occupation, 23th anniversary 












Mutual cooperation, unity and cohesion, military cooperation, 









A feat (подвиг!), Soviet victory over Nazi German Fascism, 










Liberation of Prague, heroic fight of the Soviet army on Czech 






























Slogan: Workers of the world, unite! Marxism-Leninism, 






















May 1, solidarity of working people on the planet, one family, 





































Important decisions, Central Committee of the Communist Party 













Problems, international situation, fight of the CPSU for cohesion 













Socialist democracy, rule of the people (народовластие), 





















































Mighty guardian of the world, brotherhood, Party’s leadership, 
































Big holiday, celebrations, guests, Victorious February (Feb. 21 
1948, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, with Soviet 













A sample of selected items from January to August 2014, representative of the general themes, 
organized by theme, key words, date of publication, and type of publication – factual news, 













Memory (память), past, preservation of traditions 
(сохранениe традиций), great champions, great athletes, 
heroes, loud victories (громкие победы), Soviet slogan 
“Oh sport, you [are] the world!,” heroes of the sport, 
Саша Белый, длинноногaя грудастая Ирина Шейх, 










Common duty (общее дело), National idea, ideological 
crisis, war, fire, catastrophe, survive only together, Russia 
as unique societal entity (уникальное общинное 
образование), Dostoevsky, Fyodorov (Nikolai 
Fyodorovich Fyodorov, philosopher), moral, protect the 
comrade, unity (единение), solidarity 
Jan.9 Opinion  
Maksim Kantor, 
Writer and Painter 
13_01 Negative/Abstract Merkel, Russia-Germany, intersection points (точек 
пересечения), common interests, Eurozone, gloomy leers 
from Washington (хмурые взгляды из Вашингтона), 
liberals, Ukraine, Russophobes, Anglo-Saxon bloc, global 
players (глобальных игроков), Putin as spiritual chief of 
the Other Europe defending conservative Christian values 






Negative/Abstract Ukraine, Sochi, western media, the Arab spring, RU real 
assessment vs Western “romantic” images of victory of 
liberal democracy in the Middle East 
Jan.13 Opinion Alexandr 
Rar 
16_01 Aggressive/Negative RU, Western Europe, civilizational conflict, gay 
marriages,  
Putin as the most valuable European in Europe (самый 
ценимый европеец в Европе), crisis, the Third Rome 
(Eastern Orthodox tradition) 
Jan.16 Opinion  
Boris Mezhuev 
20_01 Pathetic/Abstract Past, history, textbooks, fascism, ideologies, Putin, the 
Great Patriotic War 
Jan.20 Factual 
22_01 Aggressive/Negative Maidan, Russian nationalists, conspiracy, illness 
(болезнь), territory, religion, integration to Russia 




Aggressive Independent Ukraine but Russian city of Kyiv, reptile 
(гадина), аliens (пришельцы), incomprehensible, 





Negative/Abstract Украiна, mother, language, speech (речь), literature, two 
Ukraine (s) – left bank and Kyiv-Westernish (киевско-
западенскую)  
Jan.22 Eduard Limonov 
22_01 (4) Negative Magnitsky Act, Cold War, illiterate, the US Congress, 
haughtiness,   
Social contract, irresponsibility 
Jan.22 Opinion 
John Laughland 
23_01 (1) Aggressive, 
Negative 
Concern, anti-Semitism, attacks, radicalization, 
Radicals=Right Sector, Banderovtsy, anarchy, outrages, 









Abstract/Negative Civil diplomacy, new geopolitical bloc, ideological 
mirages, new doctrine, great countries, superpower 




24_01 Abstract/Negative Hitler with a tail, anti-Semitism, Nazism, civilized 
regression, ancient course, Judas, Right sector, 
Banderovcy, Kyiv, revolt, euro integration  
Jan.24 Igor Karaulov 
24_01 
(2) 
Abstract/Negative Fight for European integration has led to blood, 
radicalized protest  
Jan.24 Iurii Matsarskii 
28_01 Abstract/Negative Gangsters, Romanian revolution, foreigners, Western 
politicians 
Jan.28 Eduard Limonov 
29_01 Abstract/Pathetic The siege of Leningrad, Putin, Crimea, Kyiv, friends, our 






Abstract/Negative Harkov, We, the second capital of Ukraine, pro-Russian, 









Leningrad, We, holiday, patriots, motherland, common 
national relics (общенациональные святыни), fascists, 
logics, pathos 
Jan.29  
30_01 Negative The Europeans (европейцы), the Eastern Partnership, 
Достоевски, Barroso, Putin, new dividing lines in 
Europe, help (помощь), home affairs (внутренние дела), 
intervene (вмешиваться) inadmissible, civilized 
(цивилизованные) methods of fight, historical and 
cultural links, restraint (сдержанность), 
misunderstanding (недопонимание) 





Abstract/Pathetic One country – two civilizations, cleavage, federalization, 
East Ukraine=antibodies against the West’s decadent 
virus (антитела против западенского вируса), Crimea – 
the peninsula of Russian glory, Russia’s weighty word 




Poet and translator 
31_01 
(4) 
Abstract/Negative Germany, history, 100th anniversary of WWI, whoever 
wins in the fight for Ukraine (в борьбе Москвы и 
Брюсселя за Украину), take into consideration 




04_02 Abstract/Negative The romantic side of people’s violence (Irony), movie, 
everyone is watching without understanding (except RU), 







Aggressive/Negative Slavonic Anti-Fascist Front in Crimea vs Euromaidan, 
post-soviet space, colonial revolt directed by foreign 
puppeteers (заграничными кукловодами), neo-Fascism, 
Russophobia, anti-Semitism, the situation in UKR – not 
an internal affair anymore, Putin to protect the Russian-
speaking population from the fascist terror  
Feb.4 Factual  
Sergei Podosenov 
06_02 Aggressive/Negative The generation of hamburgers, the US, nationalism’s 
infection, history, us vs them, a gulf between two 



















Negative Videogames, fascists tanks vs soviet machines, anti-





Pathetic/Critical Return of the firebird, Russian culture vs cultural 
provincialism, West, Russian cultural greatness 
(величие), Rublev, Kandinsky, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, 
Tchaikovsky, Stravinsky, for civilized world the Russian 




14_02 Critical Need for new ideological platform, Russia as the keeper 
of one fifth of the water on the planet, the imperial idea, 
three postulates 
Feb.14 First Line 
Sergei Podosenov 
20_02 Negative The protests in Kyiv crossed the red line, Right sector, 
weapons, radical forces 
Feb.20 First Line 
Ianina 
Sokolovskaia 




Aggressive/Abstract Indulgence for extremism, Western politicians and their 
“clients”, East-West, Russia’s enemies, civil war, two 










Abstract/Pathetic Total lie of the world media, Ukraine as a territory, not a 
country, where a huge number of Russians live, protect 






Negative/Alarming [Russia] must not abandon Russian people, Russia has to 
help Crimea, must to help, Russian people, 70% Russian-







Negative/Alarming Coup d’état, Russian language, Russian-speakers, to 









Negative/Alarming Crimean people are scared, buses burned, beaten by 
radicals in masks, the air in Crimea is electrified, they 
afraid, they organize themselves, arm themselves in order 
to say “no” to what is happening in Ukraine, women’s 
mobilization, Internet video showing armed radicals from 
Right sector beating people; burning question from 
Crimean people – to find arms if they come to us with 
weapons, referendum (first mentioned!) 
Feb.27 Interview 
World-News 
The head of the 




Negative/Alarming Volunteers from Russia ready to help East Ukraine, 
request for assistance (просьба о помощи), moral 
support (моральной поддержки), unrests in Ukraine – 





Negative/Alarming Provocations, civilizational skirmish (цивилизационнaя 
схваткa), collapse of the Russian-speaking space, We 










Negative/Alarming Anti-Russian attitudes, moves, media, Status “a non-





28_02 Negative/Aggressive Valkyries and Muses, cultural revolutions Feb.28 Opinion 
Maksim 
Kononenko 













Negative/Aggressive Ramzan Kadyrov, coup d’état, help, Russia should not 
leave in trouble those who need its help, chaos, Ukrainian 
friends, the West 









Negative/Alarming Russia to protect its sovereignty, the USSR, Ukrainian 
coup d’état, Kyiv junta, Nazis, useful idiots for liberal 
gentlemen, At this moment the course of world history is 
fighting out (в эти минуты определяется ход мировой 
истории) 
Feb.28 Opinion, Alexandr 
Dugin, 
Philosopher 
03_03 Negative/Aggressive Diplomatic demarches have not frightened Moscow, 
diplomatic war, normalization, West, sanctions, Russia 
strikes back (boomerang effect - отвечает ударом на 
удар), the EU’s hysteria, double standards in international 
affairs (whataboutism), logic 





Pathetic People’s support (rallies) in Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
Thank you for not throwing us (Спасибо, что не 
бросаете нас); 
 
Thank you, dear, for not leaving us [03_03 (2)] 





Negative/Pathetic The use of armed forces permitted until stabilization in 
the country, gross violation of human rights and 
persecution of people based on political, religious, 
national and other traits, fraternal country (братское 
государство), people are intimidated by three months of 
outrages and injustice, to bring back the situation in 
Ukraine in the normal constitutional track, a threat for the 
life of Russian people, questioning NATO’s reasons for 
sending troops, protect Russian-speakers in East Ukraine  










Aggressive Mad Yarosh, Umarov, terrorist attacks, brothers, to live in 
peace and harmony, Russian President Vladimir Putin has 
never declared or will declare war on Ukraine and its 
people. We are talking about the need to protect hundreds 





Aggressive/Pathetic Post-Soviet Russia does not conduct intervention on its 
own territories, on its own people, the Americans 
theoreticians cannot understand that vs logic, the rumors 
about the dead of the USSR as superpower turned out to 







space. The last events witness the spirit, will and might of 
the USSR, Ahead – new great history 
03_03 
(10) 
Aggressive/Pathetic Russia is not occupying and is not annexing. The course 
of events has placed Russia, against its will, in a position 
of the only guarantee of the sovereignty of a neighboring 
country, West cannot guarantee the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine, West has failed, For a period of three months 







Aggressive/Pathetic Russia’s readiness to settle the conflict in Ukraine 
including military forces as an invitation to dialogue, 











Negative/Pathetic Our territories, fraternal people, referendum, West, Soviet 
song: “What we’ve conquered, we would never give it up 





06_03 Negative Sanctions, adequate measures, When we, the Russian 
lawyers, read the constitution of Ukraine, we have the 
impression  
that what happened in Ukraine is an anti-constitutional 
coup d’état. However, our 
European and American colleagues call it a revolution  




Negative/Pathetic The goal of the military operation (Putin): to warn Kyiv 
that for any impudent action towards the residents of the 
eastern regions they will have to pay. Russia cannot leave 
its own people in trouble 








Negative/Pathetic Hard but necessary choice to protect our own Russian-
speaking people, Putin, the US, we are not the ones who 




11_03 Negative/Pathetic Gathering of Russian lands, Historical mistake, Crimea, 
absurd, the USSR 





Pathetic Crimea boosts the historical process of reunification with 
Russia 





Pathetic/Negative Historical revenge, 1991, fear of Apocalypses, struggle 
for new 
peace would look like a sequence of local 
diplomatic clashes. Such collisions we have already seen 
around Libya and Syria. There are no rules 






Aggressive/Abstract Crushing defeat of Western Ukraine and of West in 
Ukraine 







Abstract/Pathetic Russian Crimea as the precious, 1991, historical mistake, 
Russian spiritual spring, Tolstoy, Russians are 
аwakening, shake off the dust (firebird)   





Positive Most of the Crimean people want to see themselves as 
citizens of Russia 







Negative Cold War Mar.13 Opinion  
Dmitrii'Drobnitskii 
14_03 Positive Church, Crimean Diocese registered in Russia Mar.14 Factual 
14_03 
(6) 
Aggressive/Abstract Kissinger, realism, the US, West, a blackmail: we can, 
but you cannot (нам можно, вам нет), whataboutism 
Mar.14 Opinion 
Alexandr Dugin 
08_04 Aggressive/Abstract Double standards, the revolts of the population of the 
Southeast (Donetsk, Lugansk) against the " junta " were 




14_04 Abstract Maria Vladimirovna, Grand Duchess of Russia (a great-
great-granddaughter in the male-line of Emperor 
Alexander II of Russia), Crimea as unique case, not 
revenge 
Mar.14 Interview 
27_04 Aggressive/Abstract America's goal in Ukraine - the transformation of this 
Slavic country into a bloody mess, in unstoppable chaos, 






06_05 Abstract/Aggressive Southeast, Russian-speakers, history, anticolonial fight 
against Galician украинизаторов (worldplay) and Kyiv’s 
progressors, Russia, which claims to be the 
leader of the “Russian world” 
May 6 Opinion 




Aggressive/Pathetic Meet New Russia, history, first – independence of 
Donetsk and Lugansk regions (referendums on May 11 
on their political independence) and then other close 
regions of New Russia – seen as federation of southeast 
republics – an unity among them, but not with Kyiv, the 
term New Russia – indicating the idea of independence 
but also indissoluble tie with RU, 23 years of Ukrainian 
independence = beheaded hen (обезглавленной курицы) 
May 6 Opinion 
Igor Karaulov 
Poet and translator 
07_05 Negative Referendum Donetsk and Lugansk, May 11, militias 
(ополченцы), ready for military clashes after the 
referendum 
May 7 World 
T. Baikova, 
Konstantin Volkov 
11_05 Positive Референдум приблизил юго-восток 
Украины к созданию Новороссии, киевская хунта 
May 11 World 
T. Baikova 
12_05 Positive Donetsk and Lugansk declared independence, Kremlin 
respects the decision, people’s republics 




Alarming Kyiv is trying to liquidate the leaders of people’s 
republics 
Kyiv tightens the actions against 






28_05 Pathetic/Abstract Useless indifference (Бесполезное равнодушие), why 
Russia cannot leave the Southeast of Ukraine 
May 28 Opinion 
Igor Karaulov 
29_05 Pathetic/Negative If there is a war coming, we have to protect our people, 
Libya, whataboutism,  
May 29 Opinion Oleg 
Bondarenko, 
Political scientists 
01_06 Pathetic/Negative Everything went according to the plan (Все прошло по 
плану), American models and European values vs the 
newest history of Ukraine and Russia, the whole post-
Soviet space has just started, Putin’s strategy – silent but 
effective 






03_06 Pathetic/Negative Area of law, New Russia, Russian world and culture vs 
Ukrainian nationalists and Western Nazis,  marauding 
(мародерства), criminal unities, the law above 
everything 
June 5 Opinion  
Alexandr 
Chalenko 
10_06 Negative Militia do not trust Kyiv, humanitarian corridor, 
catastrophe, Russia submitted a draft resolution on 
Ukraine that wasn’t approved 
June 10 Factual World 
Daria Tsoy 
16_06 Pathetic/Negative People’s Front (Народный фронт) – sociopolitical 
coalition created in Donetsk May 24, its goal – to protect 
civilians from Nazis bands, sponsored by oligarchs and 
foreign special services, Russia is helping the refugees 
from Ukraine, humanitarian help  
June 16 Factual World  
Konstantin Volkov 
23_06 Negative Ukrainian refugees, aggravation of the situation in the 
south- eastern Ukraine (обострения ситуации на юго-
востоке Украины), people wanting help from Russia 




Alarming Negotiations for a ceasefire in Southeastern Ukraine with 
Kyiv 
June 23 Factual World 
Konstantin Volkov 
26_06 Positive/Pathetic Putin: Главное — надежно защищать наших граждан 
от потенциальных военных угроз. Ваш долг 
не только научить солдат пользоваться современным 
вооружением и техникой. Но вы должны 
и воспитывать их на примерах патриотизма, 
стойкости и мужества, и всегда помните 
высказывание великого Суворова: «Мне солдат 
дороже себя», — обратился к военным 
Владимир Путин 
June 26 Factual  
Politics 
Egor Gurev 
25_06 Pathetic Federation Council (the upper house of the Federal 
Assembly of Russia) agrees то cancel the decision for  
use of military forces on Ukraine territory for the sake of 
peace and stability in Ukraine, normalisation, will keep 
humanitarian help 
June 25 Factual 
26_06 
(1) 
Pathetic/Aggressive Deadly logic, even not a woman’s logic, irony, TV 
propaganda, war 
June 26 Opinion Writer 
Vadim Levental 
30_06 Pathetic Refugees, Children from Southeastern Ukraine can rely 
on school and kinder garden 
June 30 Factual 
10_07 Pathetic Presentation of the book “Neo-Nazis and Euromaidan – 
from democracy to dictatorship,” book about the origin 
and development of radical nationalism in Ukraine from 
1991 to 2014; Russian propaganda; Europeans want to 
know alternative point of view  
July 10 Interview 
17_07 Negative/Aggressive The crash of Malaysian Boeing, New Russia (Donetsk), 
Kyiv’s provocation, political dividends, bad condition of 
Ukrainian military equipment, accidental shooting by 
Ukrainian fighter 





Negative Putin, the “boomerang effect” July 17 Factual 
29_07 Negative Ukrainian soldiers opened artillery fire on civilians, 
evacuation of the population 
July 29 Factual 
29_07 Negative Cold War, the epoch of power diplomacy, the US, 
Washington's choice in favor of fighting, not a 
compromise with Moscow, clashes of interests, not a 
Cold War, West 









Negative/Aggressive The battle for Ukraine as a stage in the fight for a 
new world order, West, the existence of Russia as а state 
is at stake; it is important for Russia to have a friendly 
country in such a sensitive [for it] region in military, 
political and ethno cultural terms, Boeing, Western 








Negative Boeing, Russia vs the US, a new stage of confrontation, 
Russia under Vladimir Putin is increasingly seen as a 
resurgent great power, dangerous logic 
July 29 Opinion 
Dmitri Simes 
President of The 
Center for the 
National Interest 
in Washington and 






Positive Russians are less and less concerned by the sanctions 
against Russia  
July 29 Factual 
Poll 
31_07 Negative The UN has no proof of Russia's arms supplies to 
Ukrainian militias 
July 31 Factual 
31_07 
Новороссия 
Pathetic/Abstract Russians and the way they stand up for their interests, 
historical destination,  nation, Russian Idea, Nation-wide 
Russian support (Всенародная российская поддержка 
Донецка и Луганска), New Russia – dual meaning: 
former Russian territories, New Russia (Little Russia that 
follows the Russian Federation)  
July 31 Opinion 
Sergei Mironov 
07_08 Positive Sanctions, Russia can live without hamon (ham), oysters 
and Roquefort, import, export, balance 
Aug.7 Factual 
06_08 Positive The West got the appropriate sanctions, Putin’s decree in 
support of domestic products and protection of national 
interests, sanctions won’t increase the prices, benefit (на 
пользу), will boost the national products “with no 
chemistry” and will have a beneficial effect on people’s 
health 
Aug.6 Factual 

























Appendix 5:  
 
Pravda’s two-page article reprinted by Izvestiia under the headline “The Defense of Socialism – 
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